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ABSTRACT 
The widely held view is that legal systems develop in response to 
purposeful efforts to achieve economic, political, or social objectives. An 
alternative view is that reliance on legal systems to organize social 
activity is an integral part of human nature, just as language and morality 
now appear to be directly shaped by innate predispositions. This Article 
formalizes and presents evidence in support of the claim that humans 
innately turn to legal systems to organize social behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost all legal scholars assume that legal systems develop in response 
to purposeful efforts to achieve economic, political, or social objectives.
1
 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF 
LAW (2006) (describing the growing dominance of the view of law as an instrument developed to 
achieve certain objectives); see also Leslie Green, Law as a Means (Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 8/2009, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351304 (arguing that the means by which law 
achieves various different ends is the distinguishing feature of law). 
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Evolutionary scientists,
2
 jurisprudential scholars,
3
 and law and economics 
scholars
4
 either explicitly or implicitly presume that our reliance on legal 
systems is a matter of considered choice. For example, Owen Jones, a 
leading investigator of the relationship between evolutionary science and 
the law,
5
 often uses the metaphor of the law as a ―lever‖ to communicate 
the idea that law is an instrument used to shift behavior away from innate 
tendencies.
6
 This Article considers the alternative view that the use of 
legal systems to organize social behavior is an integral part of human 
nature. 
The view that legal systems are a product of instinct is consistent with 
a growing recognition among scholars that innate predispositions play a 
crucial role in shaping many aspects of human behavior.
7
 For example, 
research on human communication shows that humans possess a suite of 
innate capabilities that are essential to the acquisition and use of 
language.
8
 Steven Pinker introduces the idea of a ―language instinct‖ to 
 
 
 2. See, e.g., MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL 
SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 200 (2006) (citing favorably anthropologist James Frazer‘s statement 
that ―law only forbids men to do what their instincts incline them to do; what nature itself prohibits 
and punishes, it would be superfluous for the law to prohibit and punish.‖ JAMES FRAZER, TOTEMISM 
AND EXOGAMY: A TREATISE ON CERTAIN EARLY FORMS OF SUPERSTITION AND SOCIETY (1910)). 
 3. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 143 (2001) (―Law is a human artifact. It is designed by humans, 
presumably because it can serve a variety of our interests.‖). 
 4. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) 
(―[Richard A.] Posner, in Economic Analysis of Law [(1972)], argues persuasively that the common 
law can be best understood as an attempt to achieve economic efficiency.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 5. See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child 
Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997); Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History: 
The Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831 (2001) [hereinafter Proprioception]; 
Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 827 (1999); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: 
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001); Owen D. Jones & 
Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005); Owen D. Jones & Daniel S. Strouse, Introduction to the Symposium 
on Biology and Sexual Aggression, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 113 (1999); Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban 
& Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV 1633 (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 415. But see Jones, Proprioception, supra note 
5, at 859 (―[A]ny assumption that law reflects only social, political, religious, and economic 
developments is both overly narrow and archaic.‖). 
 7. For an earlier recognition of the relationship between law and innate predispositions see Jim 
Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1278 (1995) (―For an 
intellectual community that prefers a sharp division between nature and culture and unflinchingly 
assigns law to the latter realm, linguistics casts a long, profoundly disturbing Darwinian shadow across 
the law.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 8. See, e.g., Marc D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky & W. Tecumseh Fitch, The Faculty of Language: 
What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?, 298 SCI. 1569, 1577 (2002); Steven Pinker & Ray 
Jackendoff, The Faculty of Language: What’s Special About It?, 95 COGNITION 201, 204 (2005).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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describe these various capabilities.
9
 Other species may possess innate 
abilities to learn vocalizations, but no other species exhibits the nuanced, 
flexible, and protean grammar present in all human languages.
10
 
There is evidence that innate predispositions strongly influence human 
faculties other than language as well.
11
 Attention has recently focused on 
the extent to which moral behavior may be influenced by predispositions 
developed over evolutionary time.
12
 John Rawls speculates in A Theory of 
Justice that morality has a deep innate structure, much as language does,
13
 
and researchers such as Joshua Greene and Marc Hauser provide evidence 
of the extent to which moral decision making is directly shaped by innate 
capabilities.
14
 
Legal scholars have begun to explore how insight into the innate 
foundations of human behavior affects our understanding of what 
motivates formation of and participation in a legal system.
15
 Robin Kar 
utilizes evolutionary science research to support his claim that both legal 
systems and moral systems rely on humans‘ innate abilities to engage in 
obligatory behavior.
16
 Others have suggested that specific substantive 
 
 
 9. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 18 (1994). 
 10. See DEREK BICKERTON, ADAM‘S TONGUE: HOW HUMANS MADE LANGUAGE, HOW 
LANGUAGE MADE HUMANS 76 (2009); W. Tecumseh Fitch, The Evolution of Language: A 
Comparative Review, 20 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 193, 206–07 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., MARCEL DANESI, THE PUZZLE INSTINCT: THE MEANING OF PUZZLES IN HUMAN 
LIFE (2002) (discussing the innate foundations of ―insight thinking‖); STANISLAS DEHAENE, THE 
NUMBER SENSE: HOW THE MIND CREATES MATHEMATICS (1997) (discussing the innate foundations 
of quantitative analysis); DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY, PLEASURE, AND HUMAN 
EVOLUTION (2009) (discussing the innate foundations of aesthetic tastes); STEVEN MITHEN, THE 
SINGING NEANDERTHALS: THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC, LANGUAGE, MIND AND BODY (2006) (discussing 
the innate foundations of music); Natalie Angier, Gut Instinct’s Surprising Role in Math, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2008, at F1 (discussing the innate foundations of mathematical problem solving abilities). 
 12. See, e.g., MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF COOPERATION (1996) (discussing the innate foundations of morality); Steven Pinker, The Moral 
Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (reviewing recent studies on the innate 
foundations of moral decision-making). 
 13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46–47 (1971). This version of the claim that moral 
behavior draws upon innate predispositions has come to be known as Rawls‘s linguistic analogy. See 
JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS‘ LINGUISTIC ANALOGY AND THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT (forthcoming Feb. 2010). 
 14. See HAUSER, supra note 2, at xviii (―I argue that our moral faculty is equipped with a 
universal moral grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems.‖) (emphasis in original); 
Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44 
NEURON 389 (2004); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment 
Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002); Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the 
Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338, 338–52 (Peter 
Carruthers et al. eds., 2005). 
 15. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, § 6 
(Magazine), at 49 (reviewing the growing influence of neuroscience on legal scholarship). 
 16. Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877, 878–79 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/2
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areas of law, including criminal law
17
 and property law,
18
 are directly 
influenced by predispositions shaped by evolution.
19
 Some scholars argue 
that similarities between legal systems and the social behavior of other 
species show that participation in a legal system is more than simply a 
cultural phenomenon.
20
 
Is the basic structure of our legal systems shaped by innate 
predispositions similar to the way the flexible and protean structure of 
language is shaped by instinct? This fundamental question about the 
relationship between legal systems and innate predispositions remains 
unanswered and largely unexplored. This Article considers whether 
humans instinctively turn to a protean system of legal rules to organize 
social behavior, a claim that I call the ―law instinct‖ hypothesis. 
In considering whether humans possess a law instinct, Part I first 
identifies essential and distinctive attributes of a legal system. Largely 
following H.L.A. Hart‘s work,21 this Article identifies three attributes as 
providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
legal system. These three attributes are: (1) subjective acceptance that 
legal rules create legitimate obligations (the normativity of law); (2) the 
union of primary rules, which specify duties, with secondary rules, which 
dictate how to create, modify, and adjudicate the system‘s primary rules 
(the two-tiered rule structure of law); and (3) a shared practice of abiding 
 
 
(2006). 
 17. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993), cited in RIDLEY, supra note 12, at 
143; Stuart P. Green, The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2104, 211213 
(2000) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998)); Robinson, 
Kurzban, & Jones, supra note 5, at 1646–54. 
 18. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property “Instinct,‖ 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC‘Y 
B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1763 (2004); see also HAUSER, supra note 2, at 369–72; Margaret Gruter, Law in 
Sociobiological Perspective, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 181, 196 (1977) [hereinafter Sociobiological 
Perspective] (―Is it possible that respect for possession in man also has a comparable genetic base?‖) 
(footnote omitted); Jones & Brosnan, supra note 5. 
 19. Jones has also made a more general argument about the relationship between substantive 
areas of law and evolutionary science, namely that the topics that a legal system addresses are shaped 
by matters that are of human import, which matters are, in turn, presumably salient from an 
evolutionary perspective. For example, Jones, Proprioception, supra note 5, at 859 (―[T]he basic legal 
curriculum . . . is basic, in part, because of the way it maps onto the fundamental, evolved, human 
needs and desires. To put it bluntly, the main topics of law reflect the main features of the evolved 
human psychology.‖); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 46675. 
 20. This claim is exemplified by the scholarship of Margaret Gruter. See, e.g., Margaret Gruter, 
The Origins of Legal Behavior, 2 J. SOC. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 43 (1979) [hereinafter Origins]; 
Margaret Gruter, Sociobiological Perspective, supra note 18, at 185–86 (―[H]uman legal behavior is 
helped or hindered by the biological program which man inherits . . . .‖). 
 21. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994). Because the attributes I identify as essential 
features of a legal system are closely related to Hart‘s jurisprudence, an alternative title for this Article 
might be ―Is There a Hartian Law Instinct?‖  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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by the rules of the legal system (the social nature of law). My claim is that 
each of these three features is essential to the existence of a legal system 
and directly draws upon innate predispositions for its expression.  
Part II presents evidence that humans possess a law instinct. I present 
evidence as support for the law instinct hypothesis that is similar to the 
evidence presented by others in support of the moral-instinct and 
language-instinct hypotheses. This research highlights several indicia that, 
when combined, suggest that a behavior draws directly upon innate 
predispositions for its expression: (1) evidence that the behavior is 
expressed early and predictably in individual development, (2) evidence 
that the underlying logic of the behavior is inaccessible to conscious 
reflection (dumbfounding), (3) evidence of specialized capabilities that are 
particularly well-suited to carrying out the behavior, (4) evidence that the 
behavior occurs in all societies (universality), and (5) evidence that the 
behavior could be a product of evolutionary processes. Not only is each of 
these indicia present when people use language or make moral decisions, 
but also when people participate in a legal system. 
As noted above, a first indication that a behavior draws upon innate 
predispositions for its expression is the early and predictable appearance of 
the behavior in individual development. In the context of language, for 
example, Noam Chomsky observes that it is ―a system of remarkable 
complexity,‖ which ―[a] normal child acquires . . . on relatively slight 
exposure and without specific training.‖22 The ease with which children 
form and participate in legal systems is evident both in the psychology 
laboratory and on the playground. Psychology experiments reveal that 
young children recognize that the content of certain rules of behavior can 
be modified by an authority figure in a manner similar to the operation of 
the two-tiered rule structure of a legal system.
23
 Likewise, many children‘s 
games contain both primary rules, which dictate how a game is to be 
played, and secondary rules, which dictate how the game‘s primary rules 
are to be established, modified, and adjudicated.
24
 
A second indication that a behavior is innate is that the behavior is 
based on a predictable and nuanced logic that is inaccessible to conscious 
reflection (dumbfounding). In the context of morality, for example, 
Jonathan Haidt shows that most people strongly disapprove of incestuous 
behavior but are incapable of providing a plausible explanation for their 
 
 
 22. NOAM CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE 4 (1975).  
 23. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/2
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disapproval.
25
 Haidt argues that such dumbfounding provides evidence 
that our morality is influenced by innate predispositions.
26
 The logic 
underlying our participation in a legal system also appears to be 
inaccessible to our conscious reflection. Much of the behavior observed in 
psychology experiments resembles the type of behavior engaged when 
participating in a legal system; however, the participants in these 
experiments are generally incapable of explaining the subtle and complex 
rules guiding their behavior.
27
 Subjects in these experiments appear to 
participate in a kind of nascent legal system and do so based on a logic 
that is inaccessible to conscious reflection. 
A third indication that a behavior is innate is the existence of 
specialized faculties that are especially well-suited to carrying out that 
particular behavior. At present, evidence linking specialized faculties to 
participation in a legal system is preliminary.
28
 Research from three 
different disciplines—anatomy, cognitive science, and genetics—can 
reveal the kinds of specialized faculties that suggest a behavior is innate. 
In anatomy, neural imaging technologies suggest a link between specific 
neural substrates and normative decision making generally,
29
 but these 
findings do not yet illuminate neural underpinnings specific to law-like 
behavior.
30
 More suggestive of specialized faculties particularly well-
suited for participation in a legal system are findings from a series of 
cognitive science experiments involving the Wason selection task. These 
experiments show that people are more adept at applying logical rules 
when a problem is set in the context of a social rule.
31
 A cognitive ability 
attuned to social-rule calculations is precisely the type of specialized 
faculty that would facilitate participation in a legal system. 
 
 
 25. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001). 
 26. See Haidt, supra note 25; Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCI. 
998 (2007). 
 27. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001) (exploring the neural substrates associated with hearing versions of 
the philosopher‘s trolley problem). My use of the term ―normative decision making‖ includes both 
abiding by moral precepts and participating in a legal system. See infra Part I.A. 
 30. But see Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60 
NEURON 930 (2008) (arguing that by specifying the neural underpinnings of subjects‘ decisions to 
determine the appropriate punishment for crimes that vary in both perpetrator responsibility and in 
crime severity, they illuminate neural underpinnings of participation in a legal system). 
 31. See infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The ubiquitous expression of a behavior is a fourth indicator that the 
behavior under study draws directly upon innate predispositions.
32
 
Language, for example, is present in all human societies—even among 
children who are raised in the absence of an adult modeling language.
33
 
Both anthropological evidence and the historical record suggest that the 
defining features of a legal system are present in all human societies. 
Evidence that a behavior could be a product of evolutionary processes 
is the fifth indicator that the behavior is innate.
34
 In the case of moral 
behavior, researchers have developed a rich literature to address the 
paradoxical evolution of altruistic behavior through natural selection.
35
 A 
law instinct is a plausible product of evolutionary processes, and this 
conclusion is supported by studies of animal behavior. While the social-
rule systems observed in other species may lack the complexity and 
flexibility of human social-rule systems, the presence of precursor 
behaviors—particularly among nonhuman primates—suggests that the use 
of legal systems could be a product of human evolution. 
If I am correct that we now have sufficient evidence to make a case for 
the existence of a law instinct, my analysis will not suddenly upend what 
we already know about legal systems, just as uncovering the innate roots 
of human language has not radically changed the rules of grammar. 
Rather, the law instinct hypothesis offers a new perspective on what kind 
of phenomenon law is. Recognizing that law is an integral part of human 
nature can guide an effort to uncover specific links between innate 
predispositions and participation in a legal system. Ultimately, this effort 
should lead to a more accurate picture of why law is present in human 
society and more discussions on how to use legal measures most 
effectively. 
I. THE LAW INSTINCT HYPOTHESIS 
There are obvious challenges to gathering evidence of a law instinct.
36
 
Many factors contribute to both the content and structure of legal systems. 
 
 
 32. See infra Part II.D. 
 33. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part II.E. 
 35. See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. The evolution of altruistic behavior is 
paradoxical because the naïve assumption would be that focusing exclusively on one‘s own well-being 
would be the best way to maximize the survival of one‘s genes. 
 36. It should be noted that even the use of the term ―instinct‖ with respect to human social 
behavior is controversial because of the interdependence between innate capabilities and cultural 
practices in the ontogeny of such behavior. Some behavioral scientists would only use the term 
―instinct‖ to refer to behavior that does not significantly depend on environmental conditioning for its 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/2
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Even if participation in a legal system is directly shaped by innate 
predispositions, legal systems are also a product of historical and cultural 
forces, just as human language is a product of both nurture and nature. 
Uncovering evidence that specifically addresses the law instinct 
hypothesis requires identifying those few behaviors that are uniquely 
engaged when participating in a legal system and also bear the distinctive 
indicia of behaviors directly shaped by innate predispositions.  
Evaluating the law instinct, therefore, requires addressing two separate 
issues. First, it is necessary to be precise about what behaviors are engaged 
when participating in a legal system. Part I considers how to distinguish 
participation in a legal system from other social activities. Second, an 
exploration of whether the behaviors engaged when people participate in a 
legal system are directly shaped by innate predispositions is necessary. In 
Part II, I identify various indicia that suggest when a behavior is directly 
shaped by innate predispositions and review the extent to which these 
indicia are present when people participate in a legal system. 
A. On the Three Essential Features of a Legal System 
The goal of Part I is to identify essential features of participation in a 
legal system. There are innumerable claims about what constitutes 
participation in a legal system. I choose to turn to the work of H.L.A. Hart 
to guide my description of the fundamental attributes of a legal system and 
do so for several reasons. First, Hart‘s positivist orientation matches the 
objective here of describing, rather than evaluating, the behaviors and 
practices that are central to the existence of a legal system.
37
 Second, 
Hart‘s analysis of the differences between legal systems and moral 
systems is helpful in distinguishing the law instinct hypothesis from the 
claim that humans possess a moral instinct.
38
 Finally, Hart‘s jurisprudence 
 
 
expression. See, e.g., ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD 75 (1997) 
(―The brain also seems to contain areas that are suitable for ‗open programs.‘ This information is not 
rigidly programmed in the way that instincts are . . . .‖) (emphasis added). 
 I use the term ―instinct‖ in a broader sense that includes predispositions that require significant 
environmental input to reach full expression. In using the term ―instinct‖ in this broader sense, I am 
following Pinker‘s use of the term ―instinct‖ to refer to a behavior that is produced by a complex 
interaction between genes and the environment. Pinker acknowledges, as do I, that this use of the term 
―instinct‖ in such a context is ―admittedly quaint.‖ PINKER, supra note 9, at 18. 
 37. HART, supra note 21, at 239 (―My aim in this book is to provide a theory of what law is 
which is both general and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal 
system or legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex 
social and political institution with a rule-governed (and in that sense ‗normative‘ aspect.‖)). 
 38. Id. at 185212.  
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continues to provide a plausible description of the essential features of a 
legal system.
39
 
Three features that Hart identifies as essential aspects of a legal system 
are: (1) the subjective acceptance that legal rules create legitimate 
obligations (the normativity of law); (2) the union of primary rules, which 
specify duties, and secondary rules, which dictate how to create, modify, 
and adjudicate the system‘s primary rules (the two-tiered rule structure of 
law); and (3) a practice shared among at least some members of the group 
of following both the primary and secondary rules of the legal system (the 
social nature of law).
40
 My claim is that a legal system can be 
characterized in terms of these three essential features: normativity, a two-
tiered rule structure, and a shared practice of rule following.  
These three defining features of a legal system play a central role in the 
construction of the law instinct hypothesis and, therefore, warrant further 
discussion. First, I consider how these three features can differentiate legal 
systems from other social practices. In particular, I show why neither 
social-norms systems nor moral systems (as I characterize these alternative 
normative systems) combine normativity and a two-tiered rule structure 
with a shared practice of rule following in the way that legal systems do.
41
 
Second, I discuss how delineating differences between legal systems and 
other normative behavior in this manner, in turn, can assist in 
distinguishing the law instinct hypothesis from prior claims regarding the 
relationship between normative behavior and innate predispositions. Last, 
I discuss the normativity, two-tiered rule structure, and shared practice of 
rule following aspects of participation in a legal system in some detail—to 
do so, I draw upon Hart‘s discussion where helpful.  
 
 
 39. See, e.g., Robin Bradley Kar, Hart’s Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 
393 (2007) (describing how Hart‘s concept of law could be extended to address ongoing disputes 
about the relationship between law and morality). 
 40. There are additional factors that Hart mentions as useful in distinguishing legal systems from 
other social practices. For example, Hart notes that legal systems are more likely to involve some form 
of ―physical sanctions‖ than other systems of social control. HART, supra note 21, at 86. Hart also 
mentions that legal systems are distinctive because they are viewed as ―necessary to the maintenance 
of social life . . . .‖ Id. at 87. Further, Hart notes that ―unity and continuity‖ are hallmarks of legal 
systems. Id. at 116. Describing a legal system only in terms of its normativity, two-tiered rule 
structure, and social nature does not, therefore, provide a precise recapitulation of Hart‘s analysis. 
 41. Throughout this Article, I use the term ―social-norms system‖ to refer to a system of social 
rules that lack a robust set of secondary rules. Other scholars have not universally accepted this usage. 
For a discussion of how my usage differs from other uses of this term, see infra notes 4244 and 
accompanying text. 
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1. Distinguishing Legal Systems from Other Types of Normative 
Behavior 
The first step in distinguishing the law instinct hypothesis from other 
claims regarding the relationship between innate predispositions and 
human behavior is to compare legal systems with moral systems and 
social-norms systems.  
Let me begin by defining what I mean when referring to a ―moral 
behavior‖ or a ―social-norms system‖ because disagreement is inevitable 
as to what types of behavior each of these terms refers to. I use the term 
―moral behavior‖ to refer only to normative behavior that is not dependent 
for its existence on either a robust system of secondary rules or a shared 
practice of rule following. In other words, as I use the term, moral 
behavior possesses only one of the three defining attributes of 
participation in a legal system, namely, the normative element.  
I use the term ―social-norms system,‖ in turn, to refer to a normative 
system in which there is a shared practice of rule following in addition to 
normativity, but in which there is not a robust system of secondary rules. 
Using the term ―social-norms system‖ in this manner is comparable to 
Hart‘s description of what constitutes a primitive legal system.42 My usage 
clearly differs from the use of the term ―social norms‖ among many 
economists and legal scholars. These other scholars argue that social-
norms systems differ from legal systems depending upon whether or not 
the system‘s normative rules are enforced by state power.43 Such scholars 
would characterize as a social-norms system any system of social rules 
that is not enforced by state power. In contrast, I characterize as a social-
norms system a social rule system that does not have a robust set of 
secondary rules. I characterize as a legal system a social-rule system that 
contains a robust system of secondary rules, regardless of whether the 
system‘s rules are enforced by a central government.44 
My usage of the terms ―moral behavior‖ and ―social-norms system‖ 
provides a simple way to identify both similarities and differences among 
 
 
 42. HART, supra note 21, at 91–92. 
 43. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 127 (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 350 (1997); Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World 
of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 167 (1997). 
 44. The appeal of using the term ―social norms‖ to include any social rules system not enforced 
by a centralized state (as others do) is that such a usage comports with the modern usage of the term 
―law‖ to refer only to state-enforced rules; however, what is lost by describing as a social-norms 
system a social-rules system that also contains a robust set of secondary rules is the ability to 
distinguish between simpler and more complex systems of normative social rules. 
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moral systems, social-norms systems, and legal systems. While they all 
have a normative dimension, social-norms systems and legal systems also 
involve a shared practice of rule following, and the union of a robust 
system of primary rules and secondary rules is a unique feature of legal 
systems. Neither moral systems nor social-norms systems possess this 
protean combination of primary rules and secondary rules.  
2. Distinguishing the Law Instinct Hypothesis from Related Claims 
Based on this comparison of moral systems, social-norms systems, and 
legal systems, identifying what is novel about the law instinct hypothesis 
is straightforward. Previous claims about the relationship between innate 
predispositions and human behavior can be separated into two broad 
categories using the terminology I set out above: moral-instinct claims or 
social-norms-instinct claims. Most moral-instinct claims consider the 
innate foundations of normative behavior generally and do not distinguish 
among moral systems, social-norms systems, and legal systems. Such 
claims have been advanced by distinguished scholars
45
 and continue to be 
an active area of research.
46
 Some of those who advance moral-instinct 
claims argue that the content of all of our normative rules is established at 
a young age.
47
 This presumption is not compatible with the law instinct 
hypothesis because the law instinct hypothesis requires that the content of 
at least some normative rules remain flexible.
48
 However, moral-instinct 
claims and the law instinct hypothesis are not necessarily antithetical as it 
is plausible that moral and legal systems both have innate foundations. 
A social-norms-instinct claim is closer to the law instinct hypothesis 
than a moral-instinct claim is, although there are still important differences 
between the two. A social-norms-instinct claim argues that both the 
normative and shared practice aspects of social-norms systems draw 
directly upon innate predispositions. One example of a social-norms-
instinct hypothesis is provided by scholarship that focuses on similarities 
 
 
 45. See Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2076–77, 2077 n.9 (2000) (book review) (providing a list of scholars 
and their work). 
 46. HAUSER, supra note 2; Haidt, The New Synthesis, supra note 26. 
 47. See, e.g., Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Stephen Stich, A Framework for the Psychology of 
Norms, in THE INNATE MIND: CULTURE AND COGNITION 280, 284–85 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 
2006). 
 48. This moral nativist perspective is most prominently associated with David Hume‘s A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739). Modern examples of moral nativist approaches include ALLAN 
GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); HAUSER, 
supra note 2; Haidt, supra note 25. 
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between human social rules and the social rule systems of other species. 
Legal scholar Margaret Gruter and ethologist Frans de Waal highlight 
many commonalities between the ways humans and other species use 
social rules to organize group behavior.
49
 However, neither Gruter nor de 
Waal explore whether the structure of animals‘ social rules shares with 
human legal systems the protean union of primary rules and secondary 
rules, and so their claims are distinct from the law instinct hypothesis. 
To better illuminate differences between a social-norms-instinct 
hypothesis and the law instinct hypothesis, a comparison of human 
language with the communication systems of nonhuman species is useful. 
Human language shares much with vocal communication in other species, 
but there are also significant, well-documented differences between the 
two.
50
 Many of these differences arise from the unique structure of human 
language, in particular, the symbolic power of words and the breadth of 
expression provided by grammatical rules.
51
 Likewise, significant 
differences exist between the social practices of humans and the social 
systems observed in animals.
52
 My claim is that these differences are due, 
in large part, to the flexibility of content afforded by the two-tiered 
structure of the rules that compose human legal systems. 
3. The Normativity of Law 
I now discuss each of the three defining features of participation in a 
legal system in further detail and begin with a consideration of the 
normative dimension of participation in a legal system. I use the term 
―normativity‖ to refer to the way various rules are treated by at least some 
members of the community as creating legitimate obligations. Hart 
observes that the ―most prominent general feature of law at all times and 
places is that its existence means that certain kinds of human conduct are 
no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory.‖53 Hart goes on to 
introduce the idea of the ―internal point of view‖ to describe more 
precisely the normative dimension of compliance with a legal rule.
54
 For 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES (1982) 
[hereinafter CHIMPANZEE POLITICS]; FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND 
WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996) [hereinafter GOOD NATURED]; Sociobiological 
Perspective, supra note 18; Gruter, Origins, supra note 20. 
 50. See BICKERTON, supra note 10; PINKER, supra note 9, at 33442; Fitch, supra note 10; Marc 
D. Hauser & Thomas Bever, A Biolinguistic Agenda, 322 SCI. 1057, 1057–58 (2008). 
 51. See, e.g., BICKERTON, supra note 10, at 226–38. 
 52. See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 53. See HART, supra note 21, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
 54. Id. at 8990. 
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Hart, decisions made from an internal point of view are influenced by an 
individual‘s commitment to abide by certain rules rather than threats and 
rewards.
55
 Hart illustrates the internal point of view by contrasting the 
obligatory nature of a legal system with the obligatory nature of 
commands made by someone holding a gun.
56
 One obeys the gunman 
because of the external threat posed by the gun. At least some of the 
participants in a legal system are motivated by a choice to abide by the 
rules of the system for reasons other than compliance with external threats. 
The normativity of law is useful in distinguishing participation in a 
legal system from participation in a system where people only comply 
with orders backed by threats. However, the normative nature of 
participation in a legal system does not distinguish participation in a legal 
system from other, related social practices. Actions guided by moral 
considerations or social norms are also likely to be normative. Therefore, 
determining that behavior is normative does not offer a way to distinguish 
among participating in a moral system, a social-norms system, and a legal 
system. The normative aspect of participation in a legal system is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to identify participation in a legal 
system.  
4. The Union of Primary Rules and Secondary Rules 
Continuing to follow Hart, I assume that the union of two types of 
rules—primary rules and secondary rules—is also an essential feature of a 
legal system. Primary rules are rules that delineate when ―human beings 
are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or 
not . . . .‖57 Primary rules include ―restrictions on the free use of violence, 
theft, and deception‖58 and impose ―various positive duties to perform 
services or make contributions to the common life.‖59  
Secondary rules, in turn, allow for the creation, modification, and 
application of primary rules. Specifically, secondary rules ―provide that 
human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of 
the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways 
determine their incidence or control their operations.‖60 
 
 
 55. Id. at 90. 
 56. Id. at 19. 
 57. Id. at 81. 
 58. Id. at 91. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 81. 
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Hart identifies three types of secondary rules. First is the ―rule of 
recognition,‖ which resolves uncertainty as to what counts as law by 
specifying the features that provide ―a conclusive affirmative indication 
that it is a rule of the group . . . .‖61 The second type of secondary rule Hart 
identifies is ―rules of change,‖62 which establish how the primary rules of a 
legal system can be created and modified. They include both rules 
governing legislative activity and ―rules which confer on individuals power 
to vary their initial positions,‖ such as the rules of contract law.63 The third 
type of secondary rules is the ―rules of adjudication,‖ which identify ―the 
individuals who are to adjudicate,‖ describe ―the procedure to be 
followed,‖ and, more generally, ―confer judicial powers.‖64 
Hart‘s taxonomy of primary rules and secondary rules illuminates a 
distinctive attribute of legal systems. Legal systems can be highly flexible 
with respect to the content of acceptable behavior. Hart observes that 
―rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to 
physical movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or 
obligations.‖65 Just as language provides a nuanced and flexible system by 
which humans communicate, legal systems provide a nuanced and flexible 
system with which they organize social behavior. 
As noted above, the presence of secondary rules in a legal system and 
the flexibility that they provide distinguishes legal systems from both 
moral and social-norms systems.
66
 Moral systems and social-norms 
systems have a normative dimension, as do legal systems. However, moral 
systems and social-norms systems do not possess a robust system of 
secondary rules. Thus, moral and social-norms systems do not provide the 
flexibility with respect to the content of normative rules that legal systems 
provide. 
Hart argues in The Concept of Law that the ―union of primary rules of 
obligation with such secondary rules‖ is crucial to understanding what is 
distinctive about a legal system.
67
 I agree with Hart‘s claim that the union 
of these two types of rules is a unique and distinctive attribute of legal 
 
 
 61. Id. at 94. 
 62. Id. at 95. 
 63. Id. at 95–96. 
 64. Id. at 97. According to Hart‘s account, in most societies these rules of adjudication also 
include rules that provide for the ―centralization of social pressure‖ and ―partially prohibit[] the use of 
physical punishments or violent self help by private individuals.‖ Id. at 95. 
 65. Id. at 81. Hart nicely observes elsewhere that: ―[w]ith the addition to the system of secondary 
rules, the range of what is said and done from the internal point of view is much extended and 
diversified.‖ Id. at 98. 
 66. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 67. HART, supra note 21, at 94. 
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systems. Throughout this Article, I refer to the union of primary rules and 
secondary rules as the two-tiered rule structure of a legal system. Much of 
the support for the law instinct hypothesis focuses on uncovering the 
innate foundations of a robust system of secondary rules—including rules 
of recognition, change, and adjudication—because these secondary rules 
are crucial in distinguishing legal systems from other normative practices. 
5. The Social Nature of Law 
A third essential feature of a legal system is a shared practice of rule 
following. If someone entirely independently of others follows a course of 
action guided by normative considerations, no matter how complex or 
flexible those normative considerations are, this individual is not 
participating in a legal system. There must be a shared practice for a legal 
system to exist; law is a social activity. 
Hart makes several helpful observations regarding the social nature of 
participation in a legal system. Hart recognizes that compliance by all the 
members of a group is too high a standard to set as the minimum social 
practice necessary to constitute a legal system.
68
 To what extent, then, 
does there need to be a shared practice of rule following for a legal system 
to exist and sustain itself? Hart offers two different answers to this 
question, depending on whether the legal system is in a primitive 
community or part of a modern state.  
For Hart, the legal system of a primitive community likely contains 
only a limited set of secondary rules.
69
 In such a legal system, the 
appropriate test to determine if a practice of rule following is sufficiently 
widespread to constitute a legal system is ―whether or not, as a matter of 
fact, a given mode of behavio[]r was generally accepted as a standard 
. . . .‖70 
The shared practices necessary to constitute what Hart describes as a 
modern or mature legal system are more complicated.
71
 In a mature legal 
system, according to Hart‘s account, the shared practices of two different 
groups need to be considered to confirm that a legal system exists—
ordinary citizens and officials. The first type of shared practice necessary 
to form a mature legal system is the same as that is necessary to sustain a 
primitive legal system, namely, a generally accepted practice of following 
 
 
 68. Id. at 23–24. 
 69. Id. at 91–92. 
 70. Id. at 109. 
 71. Id. 
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the system‘s primary rules by ordinary citizens. The second type of shared 
practice necessary for a mature legal system to exist involves the practices 
of those who are the officials of the legal system. These officials must 
have a shared practice of abiding by the system‘s secondary rules.72 For 
example, members of a judiciary must generally accept certain rules as 
guiding their official duties, although ordinary citizens may not even be 
aware that these particular secondary rules exist.  
This discussion of the social practice necessary to constitute a legal 
system completes the review of the three essential features of a legal 
system. Each of these features is incorporated into the law instinct 
hypothesis. If humans possess a law instinct, then the normativity, the 
two-tiered rule structure, and the social nature of a legal system should 
each be shown to draw directly upon innate predispositions for its 
expression. Moreover, the claim that each of the essential aspects of 
participation in a legal system is based on instinct is—to the best of my 
knowledge—a novel claim and distinct from earlier hypotheses regarding 
the relationships between innate predispositions and human behavior. 
II. EVIDENCE OF A LAW INSTINCT 
Above, I introduced the law instinct hypothesis. I now present evidence 
that humans actually do possess a law instinct. This evidence is presented 
by showing the extent to which many of the behaviors engaged when 
people participate in a legal system bear the indicia of behaviors produced 
by innate predispositions. 
The discussion in Part I highlights those behaviors that are essential to 
and distinctive of participation in a legal system. To determine if these 
behaviors draw directly upon innate predispositions, I first turn to research 
on the innate foundations of language and morality to identify indicia that 
a behavior is instinctive. Based on a review of research into the innate 
foundations of language and morality, I identify five indicia that a 
behavior is innate: (1) evidence that the behavior occurs early and 
predictably in individual development, (2) evidence that the underlying 
logic of the behavior is inaccessible to conscious reflection 
(dumbfounding), (3) evidence of the presence of specialized capabilities 
that are particularly well-suited to carrying out the behavior, (4) evidence 
that the behavior occurs in all societies (universality), and (5) evidence 
 
 
 72. Id. at 117 (―The assertion that a legal system exists is therefore a Janus-faced statement 
looking both towards obedience by ordinary citizens and to the acceptance by officials of secondary 
rules as critical common standards of official behavio[]r.‖). 
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that the behavior could be a product of evolutionary processes. Below, I 
discuss each of these indicia of the innate foundations of a given behavior 
and the extent to which they are present when people participate in a legal 
system.  
A. Early and Predictable Individual Development 
The early and predictable expression of a behavior in individual 
development provides support for a claim that the behavior draws upon 
innate predispositions for its expression. One example is evidence that 
almost all individuals achieve developmental milestones at approximately 
the same age.
73
 If such a pattern of early and predictable development is 
observed in every culture, then it is unlikely that the behavior under study 
arises solely from the transmission of cultural practices. A finding that this 
early and predictable individual development appears despite a paucity of 
stimuli provides yet further evidence of the influence of innate 
predispositions. 
Evidence of early and predictable individual development is crucial in 
suggesting that innate predispositions shape human language and human 
morality. In the case of language, for example, young children are 
precociously facile at learning the complex grammatical rules of 
language.
74
 A particularly striking example of the facility with which 
children can create a grammatically rich language is provided by the 
research of Derek Bickerton.
75
 Bickerton studies the language of children 
in worker camps in Hawaii. These camps were created by bringing 
together workers from a variety of cultures, and, as a result, there was not 
a common language shared among the adult workers.
76
 Bickerton finds at 
these worker camps that ―the children injected grammatical complexity 
where none existed before, resulting in a brand-new, richly expressive 
language.‖77 In these Hawaiian worker camps, children developed a 
grammatically complex language even in the absence of a specific adult 
model. 
An equally striking example of the ability of children to create a 
grammatically complex language, even in the absence of an adult model 
 
 
 73. Jerome Kagan, Do Infants Think?, in BASIC AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 88 (Paul Henry Mussen et al. eds., 1975). 
 74. CHOMSKY, supra note 22, at 4. 
 75. DEREK BICKERTON, BASTARD TONGUES: A TRAILBLAZING LINGUIST FINDS CLUES TO OUR 
COMMON HUMANITY IN THE WORLD‘S LOWLIEST LANGUAGES (2008). 
 76. Id. at 78. 
 77. PINKER, supra note 9, at 33; BICKERTON, supra note 75, at 101–08, 106–07. 
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language, comes from research on the communication systems developed 
by deaf children in Nicaragua starting in the late 1970s. When the 
Sandinistas took control of the country, deaf children in Nicaragua were 
moved to shared living quarters for the first time.
78
 Despite having never 
been taught a formal language, these and successive generations of deaf 
children in Nicaragua gradually developed a unique and grammatically 
robust sign language with which to communicate.
79
  
There is also evidence of early and predictable moral behavior, which 
suggests that humans possess a moral instinct. Children as young as three 
or four years old have strongly held views about what types of behavior 
are fair and unfair, appropriate and inappropriate.
80
 Moreover, the content 
of children‘s ―moral‖ intuitions appears to be quite similar, regardless of 
cultural upbringing.
81
 For advocates of the existence of both a language 
instinct and a moral instinct, the early and predictable expression of 
grammatical fluency and moral intuitions, respectively, provide evidence 
of the influence of innate predispositions. 
Likewise, two areas of research in developmental psychology suggest 
that behaviors associated with creating and sustaining legal systems appear 
early and predictably in individual development. First, many of the studies 
of normative behavior in children, which provide evidence of a moral 
instinct, also provide evidence of behavior suggestive of a law instinct. 
Children have been shown to be precociously facile at distinguishing 
between rules that have the attributes of moral systems (moral rules) and 
rules that have the attributes of legal systems (conventional rules).
82
  
Second, research on how children play games suggests that reliance on 
legal systems occurs early and predictably in development. When children 
play games, they frequently use flexible, two-tiered systems of rules to 
organize their play in much the same way that people rely on a flexible 
system of social rules to organize their behavior in legal systems. These 
two areas of study, developmental psychology and the study of children‘s 
play, and their relevance to the law instinct hypothesis are considered 
more fully below. 
 
 
 78. PINKER, supra note 9, at 36. 
 79. See Ann Senghas et al., Children Creating Core Properties of Language: Evidence from an 
Emerging Sign Language in Nicaragua, 305 SCI. 1779, 1779–80 (2004). 
 80. See, e.g., ELLIOT TURIEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: MORALITY AND 
CONVENTION 4049 (1983). 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 48. 
 82. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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1. Children’s Aptitude with the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
Children are surprisingly adept at distinguishing among different types 
of normative rules. Elliott Turiel and subsequent researchers show that 
young children treat some rules that guide behavior as subject to 
modification by an authority figure, whereas other rules that guide 
behavior are treated as inviolate.
83
 For example, children, even at a young 
age, will accept that a rule prohibiting speaking in a class out of turn may 
be modified by an authority figure, but will not accept that a rule 
prohibiting one student from hitting another student can be changed in the 
same manner.
84
 Psychologists conclude from these findings that children 
innately recognize two types of normative rules: conventional rules and 
moral rules.
85
  
There are important implications for both a moral instinct and a law 
instinct hypothesis if the ability to distinguish between moral rules and 
conventional rules is innate. The predisposition among children to treat 
certain normative rules as fixed suggests that there may be some 
normative precepts that are recognized instinctively or permanently fixed 
early in development. A second implication is that children instinctively 
recognize a system of normative rules in which the content of normative 
rules can be systematically modified. The facile recognition of 
conventional rules by young children uncovered in the experiments of 
Turiel and others also suggests that participation in a legal system draws 
directly upon innate predispositions. 
To explain more precisely why findings such as those of Turiel and 
others provide evidence of a law instinct, a review of some of the specific 
rules that Turiel identifies as conventional rules is helpful. As mentioned 
above, one example of a rule that Turiel describes as a conventional rule is 
the prohibition against speaking in a class out of turn. The content of such 
a rule is similar to the type of rule Hart would characterize as a primary 
legal rule because it imposes a restriction on a particular type of behavior. 
 
 
 83. See, e.g., HAUSER, supra note 2, at 5; SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL RULES: ON THE 
NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL JUDGMENT 6 (2004); TURIEL, supra note 80; Kar, supra note 16, 
at 888; Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett, Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children’s 
Judgments About Moral and Response-Dependent Properties, 90 COGNITION B23 (2003); Robinson, 
Kurzban, & Jones, supra note 5, at 166769; Elliot Turiel, The Development of Morality, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 903–07 (William Damon et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter The 
Development of Morality]; Elliot Turiel et al., Morality: Its Structure, Functions, and Vagaries, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN 155, 168–82 (Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb eds., 
1987). 
 84. See Turiel, The Development of Morality, supra note 83, at 907.  
 85. See sources cited supra note 83. 
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But notice that the way the content of this rule may be modified, in this 
case by the pronouncement of an authorized adult, is similar to the type of 
rule Hart would characterize as a secondary legal rule. The rules that 
Turiel describes as conventional rules reveal the effects of both primary 
rules and secondary rules. Turiel‘s distinction between moral rules and 
conventional rules is, in many respects, comparable to the distinction 
between normative rules that constitute a moral system and normative 
rules that constitute a legal system.
86
 
Finding a fixed set of ―moral‖ rules, even among young children, links 
developmental psychology and the moral-instinct claim. The significance 
of uncovering conventional rules in these same experiments has been 
largely ignored in the discussion about the innate foundations of normative 
behavior generally, but evidence of the early and predictable reliance on a 
conventional rule system to guide children‘s behavior directly supports the 
law instinct hypothesis.
87
 
2. Secondary Rules in Children’s Games 
How children play games provides another prism through which many 
aspects of human society can be better understood.
88
 One scholar of play, 
Gordon Burghardt, speculates that research on play ―may help explain 
aggression, war, morality, sex (including gender differences, courtship, 
sex roles), drug use and risky thrill-seeking behavior, educational 
endeavors, cultural achievements, creativity in virtually all realms, 
economic development, social class differences, and even the rise and fall 
 
 
 86. Several philosophers also suggest a parallel between Turiel‘s conventional rules and legal 
rules. See Allan Gibbard, Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts 7 (Mar. 30, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (―The distinction Turiel finds isn‘t between morality and non-moral 
convention, but between what is and what isn‘t contingent on authority.‖); Kar, supra note 16, at 888 
(―Turiel calls this the ‗moral-conventional‘ distinction, and these attitudes are likely important to the 
distinctions we later draw between moral and legal obligations.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 87. There are two caveats that should be recognized in inferring the universality of legal systems 
from experiments showing that children worldwide are facile at making this moral/conventional 
distinction. First, these experiments suggest that the distinction between moral rules and conventional 
rules results from differences in the type of violation the rule regulates. For example, a rule that 
involves physically harming another will be treated as an inviolate rule. However, the content of legal 
rules need not differ from moral rules. Many offenses, such as murder, are both immoral and illegal. 
Second, the specific secondary rule one can infer from Turiel‘s experiments that ―a teacher‘s statement 
may modify this rule‖ is quite simple compared to the more sophisticated secondary rules required to 
support a mature legal system. 
 88. See, e.g., JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 
23 (Harper & Row 1970) (1955) (―Now in myth and ritual the great instinctive forces of civilized life 
have their origin: law and order, commerce and profit, craft and art, poetry, wisdom, and science. All 
are rooted in the primeval soil of play.‖). 
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of civilizations.‖89 The genesis of legal systems is yet another arena in 
which how we play as children can shed light upon how we live as adults. 
The normative, or rule-based, nature of game play is evident to anyone 
who has observed children‘s play. There are clear dictates in any game as 
to what one should and should not do, and playing a game requires the 
children treat the game‘s rules as creating legitimate obligations. The 
complexity of the rules governing children‘s play is, however, easy to 
underestimate. In addition to a normative dimension, the rules engaged in 
children‘s play frequently contain both of the other two features central to 
the existence of a legal system: the union of primary rules and secondary 
rules, and a shared practice of rule following. In children‘s games, there 
are robust systems of both rules about how to play the game (primary 
rules) and about how to create, modify, and adjudicate the rules of the 
game (secondary rules). In addition, any group game will quickly collapse 
if there is not a shared practice of rule following. 
Jean Piaget, who gained fame for his research on the ontogeny of 
cognitive development, also studied the rules of children‘s games. Piaget 
discusses the similarities between children‘s games and legal systems in 
one of his first books, The Moral Judgment of the Child.
90
 In this book, 
Piaget discusses the rules regulating the game of marbles as played by 
children in Switzerland in the 1920s, explaining: ―The game of marbles, 
for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of 
rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own.‖91 Piaget 
describes how the rules of any given game of marbles are subject to 
modification based on a second set of rules, which are usually agreed upon 
in advance, much as secondary rules in a legal system are used to modify 
primary rules.
92
 The rules of marbles as described by Piaget contain a two-
tiered rule structure just as mature legal systems do.
93
  
As with legal systems, children‘s games also depend upon a shared 
practice of rule following for their existence. In both legal systems and 
game play, maintaining a shared practice of rule following is a cognitively 
 
 
 89. GORDON M. BURGHARDT, THE GENESIS OF ANIMAL PLAY: TESTING THE LIMITS 383 (2005). 
 90. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain trans., Free Press 
1965) (1932). 
 91. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 17 (―Children . . . generally agree before or during the game to choose a given usage to 
the exclusion of others.‖). A similar type of two-tiered system of rules is reported in numerous 
children‘s games in the United States and New Zealand. See generally BRIAN SUTTON-SMITH, THE 
FOLKGAMES OF CHILDREN (1972). 
 93. See also Melanie Killen & Elliot Turiel, Conflict Resolution in Preschool Social Interactions, 
2 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 240 (1991) (describing in detail another aspect of secondary rules, rules of 
adjudication, when children play games, even if game play is unsupervised).  
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challenging task. Anthony Pellegrini in his analysis of children‘s recess 
play observes that to play together children ―must learn to monitor the 
interaction for ambiguities and breakdowns of agreement and to 
compromise their views and wishes to the larger goal of interacting with a 
peer.‖94 Despite these challenges, children frequently play games and 
manage the complex social coordination tasks involved, even without 
adult supervision, further linking children‘s game play to the innate 
foundations of legal systems.  
Finally, there is evidence that children‘s game play is a human 
universal. Anthropologist Donald Brown undertook a systematic study of 
the behaviors, beliefs, and practices present in all human societies.
95
 
Among the behaviors that Brown identifies as a human universal is 
children‘s game play.96 Gordon Burghardt similarly reports: ―Play, sports, 
games, amusements, and recreation have been important components of 
human behavior in all known cultures throughout history.‖97 Children 
worldwide create and play complex, rule-based games with ease. 
Children‘s games may not match the permanence and import of legal 
systems, and there are limitations on extrapolating from children‘s 
behavior to adult behavior,
98
 but the rule systems of children‘s games do 
have much in common with fully-fledged legal systems. The ubiquity and 
precocious facility with which children create, follow, and enforce rules of 
games suggests an early and predictable ability to participate in a complex 
and flexible social rule system. 
Evidence gathered from both the laboratory and the playground 
suggests that children are innately predisposed to participate in a 
normative system that appears to be an early expression of a legal system. 
B. Underlying Logic Inaccessible to Conscious Reflection 
(Dumbfounding) 
A second indication of the innate foundations of both language and 
morality is that people behave in a predictable and nuanced manner based 
upon a logic that is inaccessible to conscious reflection; in other words, 
 
 
 94. ANTHONY D. PELLEGRINI, RECESS: ITS ROLE IN EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT 38 (2005). 
 95. DONALD BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991). 
 96. Id. at 140. 
 97. BURGHARDT, supra note 89, at 24 (citation omitted). See also PELLEGRINI, supra note 94, at 
95 (―Fully developed pretend play, including role play, seems universal in human societies, as 
witnessed in anthropological accounts.‖). 
 98. Not all of the differences between moral systems and legal systems can be discerned by 
observing the behavior of children. See supra note 87. 
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dumbfounding.
99
 Presumably, innate behaviors are less likely than other 
behaviors to be the product of conscious reflection.
100
 Moreover, while 
there may be other reasons why a behavior might be produced without 
conscious awareness—presumably if a behavior is not innate—once the 
behavior is brought to conscious awareness, the underlying logic of the 
behavior could be more easily explained than the logic underlying an 
innate behavior.
101
 When dumbfounded, people are incapable of providing 
a plausible explanation for their unconscious behavior, even when 
provided the opportunity to do so. 
Dumbfounding is especially revealing when we observe people 
behaving in ways that can be easily explained by reference to 
evolutionarily salient considerations. For example, the majority of subjects 
adversely respond to a hypothetical scenario involving an incestuous 
relationship; however, they are unable to provide a coherent explanation 
for this predictable response.
102
 The adverse reaction to an incest scenario 
can be logically explained as a product of natural selection because of the 
potential harm from incestuous mating.
103
 Thus, dumbfounding in this 
context is especially probative of the influence of innate predispositions. 
There is ample evidence of dumbfounding both in our use of language 
and in our moral decision making. In the context of language, few people 
can accurately explain the subtle grammatical details that a native speaker 
abides by without conscious reflection.
104
 The logic underlying moral 
decision making is also often inaccessible to conscious reflection.
105
 One 
well-known example of dumbfounding in moral decision making is 
provided by people‘s sensitivity to context in the so-called ―trolley 
problem.‖ Most people treat the hypothetical choice to throw a switch to 
save many lives at the cost of one life as different from the hypothetical 
 
 
 99. See Haidt, supra note 25, at 817, 818. 
 100. This claim is based on the assumption that less conscious reflection is necessary to carry out 
an innate behavior. 
 101. The basis for this hypothesis is that an individual is more likely to be familiar with the 
habitual reason that a behavior is carried out without conscious reflection if the behavior developed as 
a product of previous behavior (e.g., ―I have driven on this road for twenty years‖) rather than as a 
product of innate predispositions. But see, e.g., Antoine Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future 
Consequences Following Damage to Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7 (1994) (showing that 
normal subjects correctly adjust the choices they make in a card game without being aware that they 
are altering their strategy to maximize returns). 
 102. Haidt, supra note 25, at 814. 
 103. See Arthur P. Wolf, Westermarck Redivivus, 22 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 157, 165–67 
(1993).  
 104. See PINKER, supra note 9, at 18, 195. 
 105. See Haidt, supra note 25. 
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choice to push someone off a bridge to achieve the same outcome.
106
 It 
proves to be virtually impossible for subjects to justify why they 
distinguish between these two quite similar scenarios.
107
  
Experimental and anecdotal evidence suggest that the complex logic 
underlying participation in a legal system is similarly inaccessible to 
conscious reflection, as detailed below. This evidence of dumbfounding 
supports the claim that behaviors associated with participation in a legal 
system draw directly upon innate predispositions for their expression. 
1. Law and Dumbfounding in Economic Experiments 
Relatively few psychology experiments explicitly evaluate the effects 
of legal measures on behavior,
108 
and none of these experiments evaluate 
whether dumbfounding occurs when subjects respond to the legal 
measures being studied. Therefore, there is not a direct way at this time to 
use published experimental work to evaluate the extent to which 
dumbfounding occurs when people participate in a legal system.  
However, many psychology experiments do offer an indirect method to 
explore the connection between dumbfounding and participation in a legal 
system. An indirect inference of this relationship can be drawn because 
psychology experiments often create what might best be described as 
nascent legal systems. Participants in psychology experiments exhibit each 
of three behaviors necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal 
system. 
Once we recognize that nascent legal systems are often created in 
psychology experiments, these experiments can provide insight into how 
and why people form and participate in a legal system. This insight is 
especially important given the extent to which inferences are frequently 
drawn, perhaps mistakenly, about the various ways in which psychology 
 
 
 106. See HAUSER, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
 107. HAUSER, supra note 2, at 113–17. 
 108. But see Michael D. Guttentag et al., Brandeis’ Policeman: Results from a Laboratory 
Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate Fraud, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 239 (2008) (measuring 
the effects of disclosure rules on subjects‘ behavior); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing 
the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental 
Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2005) (measuring the extent to which messages 
from different types of sources—a random spinner, a leader selected at random, and a leader selected 
by playing a trivia game—affect subjects‘ behavior); Robert J. Oxoby & John Spraggon, Mine and 
Yours: Property Rights in Dictator Games, 65 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 703 (2008) (measuring the 
effects of altering the way in which subjects in an experiment earn access to resources); Iris Bohnet & 
Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection (Berkeley Program in Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 31, 2001) (measuring the effect of labeling an outcome as a penalty rather 
than using more neutral language to describe the same outcome). 
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experiments provide evidence of a moral instinct.
109
 I begin by 
considering, in some detail, the evidence that psychology experiments 
often create nascent legal systems. 
a. Economic Experiments as Nascent Legal Systems 
The first step in using psychology experiments to examine 
dumbfounding with respect to law is to understand how these experiments 
can create nascent legal systems. The crucial insight is that participants in 
psychology experiments often engage in the three behaviors that provide 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system: 
normativity, a two-tiered rule structure, and a shared practice of rule 
following. 
To narrow the scope of discussion, I consider only those psychology 
experiments in which subjects‘ compensation is dependent on what occurs 
within the experiment (―economic experiments‖).110 In economic 
experiments, participants‘ rewards to oneself and others are simple and 
explicit, making it easy to observe when participants are displaying 
normative behavior.
111
 In many economic experiments, participants appear 
to rely on a two-tiered system of rules to guide their normative behavior 
and to observe a shared practice of rule following when doing so. The 
discussion below highlights the law-like behavior in many of these 
experiments. 
(1)  Normative Behavior in Economic Experiments 
Participants in economic experiments behave in ways that appear to be 
strongly influenced by a willingness to abide by a set of principles, 
regardless of payoffs. For example, subjects in economic experiments 
consistently choose to act in ways that are against their own economic 
self-interest.
112
 Using Hart‘s terminology, this behavior appears to be 
motivated by normativity.
113
  
 
 
 109. See, e.g., infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 110. See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION (2003) (reviewing how economic experiments are carried out and 
summarizing findings from various types of economic experiments). 
 111. In experiments without a simple and transparent payoff structure, it may be more difficult to 
disentangle behavior that is ultimately self-interested from behavior that is unambiguously other-
regarding. 
 112. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785, 
785–86 (2003). 
 113. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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Experiments in which participants play what is known as an 
―ultimatum‖ game provide an illustrative example of how economic 
experiments can reveal decisions influenced by normative considerations. 
In an ultimatum game, there are two players, each of whom makes one 
decision. Player A (the proposer) makes the first decision of how to 
allocate a fixed amount of money between himself and Player B (the 
responder). Player B makes the second decision in either accepting or 
rejecting the allocation proposed by Player A. If Player B rejects the 
allocation proposed by Player A, then both players receive nothing.
114
  
According to traditional self-interest assumptions, Player A should 
allocate virtually all of the pot to himself, and Player B should accept this 
proposal as preferable to receiving no funds at all. However, this is not 
what is usually observed. In practice, Player As will typically divide the 
pot evenly between the two players, and most Players Bs will reject 
proposals that provide Player B less than twenty-five percent of the initial 
pot.
115
 It appears that normative considerations are guiding what is 
observed in practice. 
Experiments based on variations of the ultimatum game confirm the 
importance of normative considerations in determining how subjects 
behave in economic experiments.
116
 For example, experiments have been 
 
 
 114. To illustrate the ultimatum game, assume that Player A is initially provided a ―pot‖ of ten 
dollars. Player A now decides how much of that ten dollars each of the two players is to receive. 
Player A might decide to divide the pot evenly and allocate five dollars to each player. Player B could 
accept this proposal, in which case each player would receive five dollars, or Player B could reject this 
proposal, in which case both players would receive nothing. 
 115. See, e.g., Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCI. 
1773, 1773 (2000) (―In a large number of human studies, however, conducted with different incentives 
in different countries, the majority of proposers offer 40 to 50% of the total sum, and about half of all 
responders reject offers below 30%.‖) (citation omitted). 
 116. Normative considerations appear to influence behavior in an ultimatum game because 
participants are making choices that cannot be easily explained in terms of their desire to maximize 
their own welfare.  
 There are, however, limitations to interpreting behavior observed in ultimatum games as providing 
evidence of normativity. Players may be acting in a way that they believe is ultimately in their own 
self-interest. For example, if Player A in an ultimatum game anticipates (correctly) that Player B is 
likely to reject a proposal that Player B deems to be ―unfair,‖ then it would make sense for Player A to 
allocate more than a minimal payout to Player B, based solely on self-interested considerations. In this 
situation, if Player A fails to make a ―minimally fair‖ allocation, Player A would end up with nothing 
as a result of Player B‘s rejection of the offer.  
 Conversely, Player B may reject a Player A proposal in an ultimatum game in an effort to 
encourage more generous proposals in the future or as retribution for a proposal that Player B feels is 
inadequate. Maintaining player anonymity and eliminating the possibility of repeated play between the 
same players can minimize these potentially confounding motivations, but additional evidence that 
normative considerations play a role in participants‘ choices in the ultimatum game comes from 
experiments based on the dictator and third-party punishment games, as discussed more fully in the 
text that follows.  
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run in which subjects play what is known as a ―dictator‖ game.117 In a 
dictator game, there is only one move. Player A decides how to divide the 
pot between Player A and Player B. The average proposal made by Player 
A to Player B in the dictator game is less than that made by the average 
Player A in the ultimatum game;
118
 however, the mean proposal made by 
Player A in the dictator game remains well above zero.
119
 The behavior 
observed in both the ultimatum and dictator games provides evidence 
suggesting the influence of normative considerations. 
The third-party punishment game is another game that economic 
experimenters have used to study normative behavior. In a third-party 
punishment game, there are three players. The roles of Players A and B are 
the same as in the ultimatum game, but now we introduce Player C who 
observes the choices made by Players A and B. Player C is given an 
opportunity to reduce the payout to Player A at a personal cost to Player 
C.
120
 In experiments based on the third-party punishment game, the subject 
given the role of Player C consistently chooses to reduce the payout to a 
Player A who is deemed to have made an unfair proposal.
121
 This 
expenditure of personal resources to punish perceived violations confirms 
that subjects in economic experiments are willing to impose a penalty on 
someone who is deemed to have acted inappropriately, even when doing 
so imposes a personal cost. Furthermore, this behavior is still observed 
even when the subject paying that additional cost has not been personally 
harmed by the other participant‘s action. 
Based on findings from the economic experiments reviewed above, it is 
now accepted that normative considerations affect the behavior of subjects 
in economic experiments.
122
 
(2)  Two-Tiered Rule Structures in Economic Experiments 
The behavior of participants in psychology experiments also appears to 
rely on a two-tiered rule structure to determine what normative rules to 
apply in a given context. Recall Hart‘s observation that an essential and 
 
 
 117. See CAMERER, supra note 110, at 4956. 
 118. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 112, at 786. 
 119. Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 347, 362 (1994). 
 120. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 66 (2004). 
 121. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 112, at 786 (reporting that ―55% of the third parties punish 
the allocator for transfers below 50[%], and the lower the transfer, the higher the punishment‖).  
 122. See, e.g., id. at 790. 
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distinctive feature of legal systems is the union of rules that specify duties 
(primary rules) and rules that guide the creation, modification, and 
application of these primary rules (secondary rules).
123
 Both primary rules 
and secondary rules appear to influence behavior in economic 
experiments. The discussion above reviewed how behavior observed in the 
ultimatum game, the dictator game, and the third-party punishment game 
reveals the effects of primary normative rules.
124
  
Evidence of the effects of secondary rules on behavior is provided by 
economic experiments that show that changes in the amount of 
communication allowed among subjects in the experimental context affect 
the extent to which subjects engage in normative behavior. This sensitivity 
to allowing communication among subjects and to the framing of the 
experiment reveals a shared understanding among subjects about how to 
determine what normative rules to apply in a given situation. Details of the 
effects of allowing communication and framing among subjects in 
economic experiments and the connection to secondary legal rules is 
described more fully below. 
(a) The Effects of Communication in Economic Experiments 
Findings from economic experiments on the effects on behavior of 
permitting communication suggest that the influence in economic 
experiments of certain normative rules are comparable to the secondary 
rules of a legal system. Allowing communication among study participants 
consistently increases contributions to others in economic experiments. 
This is one of the main findings of a survey of economic experiments 
involving public goods games carried out over a thirty-year period.
125
 
Similarly, David Sally compiled findings from over 100 economic 
experiments and reports that allowing subjects to communicate increases 
cooperation at a statistically significant level.
126
  
One can expect an increase in altruistic behavior as a result of allowing 
communication among subjects in certain circumstances because 
communication can help facilitate coordination.
127
 However, the effects of 
 
 
 123. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 124. See supra Part II.B.1.a.1. 
 125. John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 156–58 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
 126. David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of 
Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC‘Y 58, 61 (1995). 
 127. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (describing 
various ways to coordinate behavior and introducing the concept of a focal point). 
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communication observed in economic experiments go well beyond the 
facilitation of coordination. In many experiments, for example, 
communication consists of nothing more than what economists call ―cheap 
talk,‖ which occurs when there is no way to make one‘s communications 
credible.
128
 Yet even when talk is cheap and the behavior under study does 
not involve coordination, allowing communication consistently increases 
the willingness of subjects to act in an altruistic manner.
129
 The best 
explanation of these communication effects is that study participants have 
a shared understanding of how to use communication to create normative 
obligations.
130
 These communication effects, therefore, provide evidence 
of a shared understanding as to what counts as a legitimate secondary rule 
within an economic experiment. 
An economic experiment carried out by Jean-Robert Tyran and Lars P. 
Feld nicely illustrates how allowing communication in an economic 
experiment can reveal the influence of commonly accepted secondary 
rules.
131
 Tyran and Feld study the effect of requiring participants in an 
economic experiment to collectively ratify the rules that will govern 
subsequent behavior in the experiment. In one treatment, subjects get to 
decide whether they want to enact a mild set of sanctions to encourage 
cooperation. In another treatment, the same mild set of sanctions is 
imposed upon the group exogenously by the experimenter. Tyran and Feld 
compare how subjects behave under each treatment and find that when 
participants elect to ―enact‖ sanctions, far more contributions are made to 
the public good.
132
  
The Tyran and Feld experiment shows how a particular practice, in this 
case the choice by the group to adopt a set of mild sanctions, will be 
 
 
 128. Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk and Coordination, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 224 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 129. See Gary Charness, Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann’s Conjecture, 33 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 177 (2000) (finding nonbinding messages increase efficient outcomes even in 
situations where interests conflict completely); Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Achieving 
Compliance When Legal Sanctions Are Non-Deterrent, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 135 (2006) 
(finding an effect on behavior depending upon whether a rule is exogenously imposed or 
endogenously enacted, despite the fact that there are no other changes in the amount of communication 
allowed or in the ability of participants in the experiment to impose sanctions). 
 130. Another explanation of the effect of communication in these noncoordination settings is that 
communication triggers psychological affinities. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance 
and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 653, 658 (1996) 
(claiming to have found evidence that the degree of the subjects‘ ―social distance from the 
experimenter‖ has an effect on the level of altruism in dictator games, which could also explain effects 
of allowing communication among participants in economic experiments, but in the Tyran and Feld 
study the effects of affinity are controlled for). 
 131. Tyran & Feld, supra note 129. 
 132. Id. at 151. 
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consistently treated by study participants as creating a legitimate 
obligation. More generally, the Tyran and Feld finding suggests that one 
of the ways permitting communication can alter normative behavior is by 
providing members of a group an opportunity to behave in a manner that 
they accept as a legitimate means to establish normative rules. 
(b)  Framing Effects in Economic Experiments 
If subjects in economic experiments are relying on a fixed set of 
normative rules to guide their decision making, then we would not expect 
their normative behavior to be highly contingent on the experimental 
setting. However, framing effects, or small changes in experimental 
context, often produce significant changes in subject behavior. For 
example, experimenters observe that small changes in wording 
significantly affect the willingness of subjects to act in a generous manner. 
The most parsimonious explanation of these framing effects is that 
subjects in economic experiments are influenced by secondary rules, 
which determine what primary normative rules to apply in a given setting. 
Framing effects are one of the most widely observed phenomena in 
economic experiments. Sally, based on his review of economic 
experiments, identifies the wording of instructions as one of the two most 
important factors in explaining variations in the level of normative 
behavior observed.
133
 An example of an economic experiment showing the 
extent to which small changes in context dramatically affect the level of 
normative behavior observed is an experiment carried out by Richard 
Cookson based on a public goods game.
134
 A public goods game is a 
multi-player version of the prisoner‘s dilemma game in which it is rational 
for the individual to be selfish, but in which all players are better off if 
everyone contributes to the public good.
135
 In one treatment, Cookson 
describes a contribution to the public good as a decision to put funds into a 
common pool.
136
 In another treatment, a contribution to the public good is 
described as a decision to give and keep one‘s funds.137 Cookson finds that 
 
 
 133. Sally, supra note 126, at 78 (as discussed above, supra note 126 and accompanying text, 
Sally also finds a substantial effect from allowing communication between participants). See, e.g., 
Ledyard, supra note 125; Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economics Analysis of 
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (1998). 
 134. R. Cookson, Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments, 3 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 55 
(2000). 
 135. See LEDYARD, supra note 125, at 112. 
 136. Cookson, supra note 134, at 61, 73, 75. 
 137. Id. 
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describing a contribution to the public good in terms of giving or keeping 
results in substantially greater contributions.
138
 The sensitivity of 
participants to this subtle change is problematic for an explanation of 
behavior based on a simple choice to follow a cogent fixed set of 
normative rules because it is unclear why such rules should be sensitive to 
minor wording changes. The existence of a second set of rules, which 
determine when normative rules apply and which Cookson‘s framing 
manipulation engages, provides a better explanation for this sensitivity.
139
 
A few economic experiments are cognizant of the potential parallels 
between participation in a legal system and behavior in an economic 
experiment and have analyzed the effects of manipulations that are 
specifically designed to mimic legal rules.
140
 For example, Robert Oxoby 
and John Spraggon study the effects of altering the way in which 
participants determine property rights in a dictator game.
141
 The Oxoby 
and Spraggon experiment begins with participants taking an aptitude test. 
The subjects then participate in a dictator game in which performance on 
the aptitude test affects how much money is placed in the pot to be 
allocated between the two players. If the performance on the aptitude test 
of the player making the allocation (Player A) determines the size of the 
pot, the typical allocation to the other player (Player B) is zero.
142
 
However, if Player B‘s performance determines the amount in the pot, the 
typical allocation Player A makes to Player B is around fifty percent of the 
pot.
143
 In the Oxoby and Spraggon experiment the structure of how an 
initial allocation is made—comparable in some respects to a legal property 
rule—has a significant influence on the extent to which subjects choose to 
act in a generous manner.
144
 
Sensitivity to framing effects exhibited by subjects in economic 
experiments is best explained as the product of a shared understanding of 
the secondary rules used to determine what primary rules to apply in a 
given context.
145
 
 
 
 138. Id. at 6566. 
 139. This explanation does not entirely solve the problem because the issue of why these 
secondary rules are sensitive to subtle wording changes is not considered. See infra note 145. 
 140. See supra note 108. 
 141. Oxoby & Spraggon, supra note 108. 
 142. Id. at 704, 706. 
 143. Id. at 704, 707–08. 
 144. The recognition of a property right, per se, is not necessarily evidence of a two-tiered legal 
system, but what is suggestive of secondary rules in this experiment is the apparent consensus about 
how property rights can be created—e.g., by having your performance on a quiz determine initial 
allocations. 
 145. A plausible explanation for the effects of these framing manipulations on normative behavior 
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The effects on behavior of allowing communication and of changing 
context in economic experiments discussed above have been observed on 
many occasions. However, scholars continue to exclusively interpret the 
behavior of subjects in economic experiments as providing evidence of 
moral behavior.
146
 Those who interpret economic experiments in this 
manner usually assume that moral behavior is the only possible 
explanation for the normative behavior exhibited when subjects choose to 
benefit or punish others at their personal expense. However, normative 
behavior can also provide evidence of participation in a legal system or a 
social-norms systems.
147
 In fact, the ways in which subjects‘ normative 
behavior varies depending on whether communication between subjects is 
allowed and on the way an experiment is framed suggest the influence of a 
normative system that is flexible with respect to content, such as a legal 
system. 
(3) A Shared Practice of Rule Following in Economic Experiments 
Law is a social phenomenon. In addition to normativity and a two-
tiered rule structure, there must also be a shared practice of rule following 
for a legal system to exist.
148
 The third and final issue in considering 
whether an economic experiment creates a nascent legal system is a 
determination of whether a shared practice of following the same 
normative rules exists among the subjects in an experiment.
149
 
The fact that experiments can be repeated in a controlled environment 
makes it a simple matter to address the issue of whether experiments 
simulate the social nature of a legal system. For the most part, only 
patterns of behavior that recur at a statistically significant level will be 
reported as a finding from an experiment. A statistically significant effect 
in an experiment that involves multiple subjects almost by definition 
 
 
is that they are the product of primary normative rules, which are highly sensitive to subtle changes in 
context. Such a possibility is explored in Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN 
SCIS. 531 (2005). A discussion of why I find efforts to explain framing effects solely in terms of a 
nuanced set of primary rules less appealing is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 146. See, e.g., HAUSER, supra note 2, at 75–82. 
 147. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 148. See supra Part I.A.5. 
 149. There is a related question that I do not address. That question is whether the existence of a 
shared practice of rule following is part of what contributes to the obligatory nature of a legal system. 
There is disagreement among jurisprudential scholars as to whether such a motivation is a defining 
attribute of legal systems. See, e.g., Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional 
Rule?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2007) (claiming that Hart did not intend to argue that a 
normative obligation based on the shared practice of rule following is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a legal system).  
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provides evidence of a shared practice of rule following among the 
experiment participants. It is this evidence of a shared practice of rule 
following that provides the basis for claims that economic experiments 
reveal universal moral behavior.
150
 This same pattern of a shared practice 
of rule following suggests that these experiments may recreate the social 
nature of a legal system. 
b. Dumbfounding in Economic Experiments 
Each of the three essential features of participation in a legal system—
normativity, a two-tiered rule structure, and a shared practice of rule 
following—is present when people participate in economic experiments. 
For this reason, economic experiments offer an important venue in which 
to study the salient features of participation in a legal system. The issue I 
address here is how economic experiments provide insight into the extent 
to which dumbfounding (inaccessibility to conscious reflection of the logic 
underlying a behavior) is associated with behaviors engaged when 
participating in a legal system.
151
  
The extent to which there is dumbfounding associated with 
participation in a legal system can be inferred from a number of economic 
experiments that suggest a high degree of dumbfounding in these 
experiments generally. The best evidence of dumbfounding in economic 
experiments comes from studies of the effects of stimuli that are relevant 
from an evolutionary perspective, but are otherwise meaningless. As noted 
above, sensitivity to evolutionarily salient, but otherwise meaningless, 
stimuli is highly suggestive of an innate reaction.
152
  
One example of such an effect in an economic experiment is the 
sensitivity of subjects to images that vaguely resemble human eyes.
153
 
 
 
 150. See, e.g., HAUSER, supra note 2, at 77–79. 
 151. Below, I suggest how evidence from economic experiments might help to identify neural 
substrates (see infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text) and genetic foundations (see infra note 196 
and accompanying text) of participation in a legal system. I also use evidence from economic 
experiments to support the claim that participation in legal systems is a human universal (see infra 
notes 242–44 and accompanying text).  
 152. See supra Part II.B.  
 153. See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412 (2006) (finding an image of a pair of eyes increased 
contributions to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room); Kevin J. Haley & Daniel M.T. 
Fessler, Nobody’s Watching? Subtle Cues Affect Generosity in an Anonymous Economic Game, 26 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 245 (2005) (finding a computer displaying eyespots substantially 
increased contributions in a dictator game); Robert Kurzban, The Social Psychophysics of 
Cooperation: Nonverbal Communication in a Public Goods Game, 25 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 241 
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Terence Burnham and Brian Hare, for example, study behavior in a public 
goods game in which half of the subjects work in front of a computer 
displaying the image of a robot.
154
 Subjects who are exposed to the robot 
image make more generous contributions than do subjects who did not 
have the image of a robot on their screen.
155
 Burnham and Hare conclude 
that the robot‘s appearance (most likely its human-like eyes) triggers an 
evolutionarily salient stimulus.
156
 Burnham and Hare‘s experiment shows 
how a manipulation in an economic experiment can affect behavior in 
ways that an evolutionary scientist, but neither the subjects themselves nor 
an economist, could explain.
157
 
There is even some evidence of dumbfounding in those economic 
experiments that more directly replicate salient aspects of participation in a 
legal system. I noted earlier how changes in the context of an economic 
experiment can mimic the ways the secondary rules of a legal system can 
alter the content of normative rules.
158
 Dumbfounding almost certainly 
occurs with respect to the effects of many of these changes in framing on 
normative behavior. For example, the Cookson study cited above found 
significant changes in the expression of normative behavior resulting from 
slight changes in the wording of instructions.
159
 It seems unlikely that a 
subject in the Cookson experiment could explain such a pronounced 
sensitivity to slight modifications in the wording of instructions. Even 
after considered reflection, it is unclear why describing a choice as a 
contribution into a common pool versus a decision to give and keep one‘s 
funds should lead to such significantly different levels of contribution.  
Another of Cookson‘s findings further supports the presence of 
dumbfounding with respect to framing effects. Cookson reports that 
delaying the restart of a public goods game by as little as thirty seconds 
significantly increases cooperation.
160
 It is implausible that subjects can 
explain why they alter their behavior because of the introduction of a 
 
 
(2001) (asking subjects to engage in mutual eye gaze led to an increase in contributions in economic 
experiments). 
 154. Terence Burnham & Brian Hare, Engineering Human Cooperation: Does Involuntary Neural 
Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?, 18 HUM. NATURE 88 (2007).  
 155. Id. at 98–99. 
 156. Id. at 99–100. There is evidence that many species have evolved sensitivity to being in the 
line of sight of a conspecific. See, e.g., Joanna M. Dally, Nathan J. Emery & Nicola S. Clayton, Food-
Caching Western Scrub-Jays Keep Track of Who Was Watching When, 312 SCI. 1662 (2006) 
(describing how one bird species keeps track of other conspecifics observed caching earlier). 
 157. Burnham & Hare, supra note 154, at 88–91. 
 158. See supra Part II.B.1.a.2. 
 159. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 160. Cookson, supra note 134, at 6265. 
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slight delay between rounds. The law-like behavior Cookson observes 
appears to be produced by a logic that is inaccessible to conscious 
reflection. 
The effects of framing and allowing communication are part of the 
evidence that economic experiments create nascent legal systems. It seems 
unlikely that subjects in these experiments could explain the underlying 
logic that leads to their sensitivity to these changes. Some aspects of the 
nascent legal system created within the confines of an economic 
experiment, therefore, appear to be associated with dumbfounding—one 
indicia of a behavior that draws directly upon innate predispositions for its 
expression. 
2. Confusion about Law in Everyday Life 
There is also evidence that dumbfounding occurs when people 
participate in a legal system in the ordinary course of their lives. People 
tend to be quite facile at and have strong intuitions about participation in a 
legal system, even though such participation engages a complex and 
nuanced suite of behaviors.
161
 At the same time, few people are capable of 
explaining in a coherent manner the logic underlying the basis for their 
participation in a legal system. 
Difficulty in explaining the logic underlying participation in a legal 
system is evident not only among ordinary citizens, but also among those 
who are active participants in the legal system. Hart observes what a 
conversation with most lawyers reveals: ―even skilled lawyers felt that, 
though they know the law, there is much about law and its relations to 
other things that they cannot explain and do not fully understand.‖162  
The basic logic underlying participation in a legal system is even a 
matter of dispute among jurisprudential scholars. Scott Shapiro nicely 
observes, ―the philosophical project of jurisprudence begins with the 
observation that the law‘s claim to legal authority is actually a deeply 
paradoxical assertion.‖163 Basic questions of jurisprudence have proven to 
 
 
 161. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of 
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) (providing statistical evidence of shared intuitions about 
appropriate punishment levels). 
 162. HART, supra note 21, at 13. See also id. at 2 (―To this unending theoretical debate in books 
[about what law is] we find a strange contrast in the ability of most men to cite, with ease and 
confidence, examples of law if they are asked to do so.‖). 
 163. Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125 (Jules L. 
Coleman ed., 1999). 
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be much more difficult to resolve than might be expected given the 
widespread reliance on legal systems to order social behavior. 
The difficulty both practitioners and philosophers face in explaining 
the nature of participation in a legal system provides anecdotal evidence 
that dumbfounding occurs when people participate in a legal system. This 
anecdotal evidence of dumbfounding compliments the evidence of 
dumbfounding from economic experiments discussed above—that 
participation in a legal system is carried on without an ability to explain 
the system‘s underlying logic. 
C. Specialized Faculties 
Evidence of abilities that are especially well-tailored to carry out a 
particular behavior is a third indicator that the behavior under study is 
innate. Research from three different disciplines can provide evidence of 
specialized faculties that are well-tailored to carry out a particular 
behavior: (1) anatomy, (2) genetics, and (3) cognitive science. First, 
research in anatomy can provide evidence of specialized faculties from 
which it can be inferred that an ability is innate. Such anatomical evidence 
of instinctive behavior is often straightforward. For example, much of a 
bird‘s ability to learn to sing is subserved by a dedicated neuroanatomy, 
directly linking birdsong and innate predispositions.
164
 Second, links 
between particular genes and a given behavior can provide evidence that a 
behavior draws upon innate predispositions. For example, there is now 
evidence that one particular gene can trigger dramatic differences in the 
social practices of related species of voles.
165
 Finally, evidence of 
cognitive abilities that are particularly attuned to supporting specific 
behaviors may suggest that the behavior so supported is a product of 
evolution. For example, the notable ease with which children learn 
complex rules of grammar is part of the evidence of an innate human 
language faculty.
166
 
Findings from anatomy (primarily neuroanatomy), genetics, and 
cognitive science support the claim that humans have specialized faculties 
that are particularly well-suited to carrying out behaviors engaged when 
participating in a legal system, as discussed more fully below. 
 
 
 164. See, e.g., Fernando Nottebohm, The Neural Basis of Birdsong, 3 PLOS BIOLOGY 759 (2005). 
 165. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.  
 166. CHOMSKY, supra note 74, at 4. 
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1. The Neuroanatomy of Participation in a Legal System 
The existence of specialized anatomical features often suggests that a 
behavior is innate. These types of specialized anatomical features can be 
uncovered by studying both gross anatomy and neuroanatomy. Anatomical 
evidence of specialized faculties that subserve human language and moral 
decision making is illustrative. In the context of language, humans appear 
to have several gross anatomical features (such as a descended larynx) that 
are particularly well-designed for the production of complex 
vocalizations.
167
 There is also neuroanatomical evidence that language has 
―an identifiable seat in the brain[.]‖168 For example, postmortem 
investigations of the brains of individuals who have language deficits (a 
method of investigating the brain‘s functional anatomy known as the 
lesion method) show that injuries to an area of the brain called Broca‘s 
area are associated with slow, labored, and ungrammatical speech,
169
 
whereas injuries to an area of the brain called Wernicke‘s area are 
associated with the production of nonsensical, but grammatically correct 
phrases.
170
  
Neuroanatomical evidence generated using the lesion method also 
suggests a link between specific areas of the brain and normative 
behavior.
171
 The case history of Phineas Gage provides a well-known 
example of the relationship between damage to the prefrontal cortex and 
social behavior.
172
 Gage was a railroad foreman in the United States in the 
1800s when an accident sent an iron rod through part of his skull and 
brain.
173
 The injury caused Gage to act in a carefree and socially reckless 
manner that was in marked contrast to his behavior prior to the injury. 
Twenty years after the accident, John Harlow hypothesized that Gage‘s 
 
 
 167. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, HUMAN: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHAT MAKES US UNIQUE 44–45 
(2008). But see Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, supra note 8, at 1574 (observing that other species have 
descended larynxes). 
 168. PINKER, supra note 9, at 45; Nina F. Dronkers et al., Language and the Aphasias, in 
PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 1174–75 (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000). 
 169. Dronkers et al., supra note 168, at 1175–79. 
 170. Id. at 1179–80. 
 171. See, e.g., Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to 
Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032 (1999); Michael Koenigs 
et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908 
(2007). 
 172. Eric R. Kandel, Integration of Sensory and Motor Function: The Association Areas of the 
Cerebral Cortex and the Cognitive Capabilities of the Brain, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, 
supra note 168, at 352–53; Hanna Damasio et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain 
from the Skull of a Famous Patient, 264 SCI. 1102 (1994). 
 173. Damasio et al., supra note 172, at 1102. 
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change in behavior was the result of an injury to the frontal region of his 
brain caused by the iron rod accident.
174
  
New technologies have enhanced our ability to identify the 
neuroanatomical underpinnings of human behavior. One important 
technological innovation in neuroanatomy involves the use of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques. fMRI techniques use an 
imaging machine to identify areas of the brain where there are heightened 
levels of brain activity when subjects are engaged in a particular task.
175
 
fMRI techniques can generate more precise information about the 
relationship between neuroanatomy and behavior than the lesion method 
and enable the study of the neural underpinnings of nonaberrant behavior. 
As a result, fMRI techniques have rapidly advanced our understanding of 
the neuroanatomy of ordinary normative decision making.
176
 
While there is, as of yet, no direct evidence of either gross or 
neuroanatomical features associated specifically with participation in a 
legal system, evidence of an association between heightened brain activity 
in specific neuroanatomical regions and the tasks engaged when 
participating in a legal system can be inferred from two related areas of 
research. The first area of research is the study of the neuroanatomy of 
human social behavior generally. The second area is the study of the 
neuroanatomy of decision making in economic experiments. If I am 
correct that economic experiments often create nascent legal systems,
177
 
then the neuroanatomy of decision making within economic experiments 
may help to illuminate the neuroanatomy associated with participation in a 
legal system. 
Our understanding of the neural underpinnings of human social 
behavior is developing rapidly. Among the many activities involving 
social cognition that now appear to be subserved by specific neural 
substrates are: the ability to evaluate the motivation of others, the ability to 
reason about the mental states of others, and the ability to experience 
emotional empathy.
178
 These elements of social cognition are capabilities 
 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Brain areas that play a role in performing a particular task require additional oxygen, and an 
increase in oxygen consumption temporarily increases magnetic levels in the affected area. fMRl 
machines can detect this increase in magnetic activity. Clifford B. Saper et al., Integration of Sensory 
and Motor Function, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 168, at 370–71. 
 176. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 344–50; Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the 
Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007) (reviewing the various brain regions identified as involved in 
normative decision-making). 
 177. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 178. See, e.g., Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour, 4 NATURE 
REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 165 (2003); Ralph Adolphs, How Do We Know the Minds of Others? Domain-
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that not only appear to have a predefined locus in the brain, but also are 
crucial to our ability to participate in a legal system. The existence of a 
specialized neuroanatomy for dealing with social behavior is consistent 
with the claim that reliance on a legal system to order social behavior 
draws directly upon innate foundations. 
Researchers are also applying brain imaging and related techniques to 
study the neural substrates of decision making in economic experiments.
179
 
Findings from one study of the neural substrates of subjects‘ decision 
making in an ultimatum game are illustrative. Sanfey et al. compare fMRI 
images of subjects playing one of two scenarios in an ultimatum game.
180
 
In both scenarios, the participant plays the role of Player B (the responder) 
and receives two offers—one in which the pot is split evenly and another 
in which Player A proposes keeping most of the pot.
181
 Depending on the 
scenario, Player A is either a computer or a person the subject had met 
earlier. Player B is shown whether the other player is the computer or the 
person.
182
 Sanfey et al. find heightened activity in brain areas associated 
with emotion when subjects receive a low offer from another person rather 
than from a computer.
183
 This result suggests that there is a predictable 
link between a rule violation by another person and heightened activity in 
a specific area of the brain. 
Findings such as those reported by Sanfey et al. are typically 
interpreted as providing evidence of the neuroanatomy of moral decision 
making. This interpretation of the neuroanatomy of decision making in 
economic experiments follows from the assumption that normative 
decision making in economic experiments is produced by moral 
considerations. As an example, Sanfey et al. interpret a decision by Player 
B in an ultimatum game to reject offers deemed to be unfair as evidence of 
 
 
Specificity, Simulation, and Enactive Social Cognition, 1079 BRAIN RES. 25 (2006); Chris D. Frith & 
Uta Frith, Implicit and Explicit Processes in Social Cognition, 60 NEURON 503 (2008); Matthew D. 
Lieberman, Social Cognitive Neuroscience: A Review of Core Processes, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259 
(2007); Rebecca Saxe, Uniquely Human Social Cognition, 16 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 235 
(2006).  
 179. See, e.g., Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 
SCI. 1254 (2004); Daria Knoch et al., Diminishing Reciprocal Fairness by Disrupting the Right 
Prefrontal Cortex, 314 SCI. 829 (2006); Alan G. Sanfey, Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game 
Theory and Neuroscience, 318 SCI. 598 (2007); Manfred Spitzer et al., The Neural Signature of Social 
Norm Compliance, 56 NEURON 185 (2007). 
 180. Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum 
Game, 300 SCI. 1755 (2003). 
 181. Id. at 1756. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1756–78. 
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moral behavior.
184
 However, the choice to reject an offer in an ultimatum 
game is contingent on framing and communication in ways that are 
consistent with participation in a legal system. More generally, decision 
making in an economic experiment may resemble legal decision making 
as much as, if not more than, it resembles moral decision making.
185
 As a 
result, the findings of Sanfey et al., among other studies, may illuminate 
the neuroanatomy of participation in a legal system. 
One notable exception to the claim that the neuroanatomy of 
participation in an experiment only provides evidence of the neural 
substrates of moral behavior is a study by Joshua Buckholtz and 
colleagues.
186
 Buckholtz et al. claim to have identified some of the neural 
substrates specifically engaged when participating in a legal system. Their 
work presents evidence of the neural substrates activated when subjects 
attempt to determine the appropriate punishment for crimes that vary both 
in terms of perpetrator responsibility and crime severity.
187
 Buckholtz et 
al. argue that studying these types of punishment determinations provides 
evidence of the neural substrates associated with legal decision making 
because ―the distinctive core and distinguishing feature of legal decision-
making is the computation and implementation of a punishment that is 
appropriate both to the relative moral blameworthiness of an accused 
criminal offender, and to the relative severity of that criminal offense.‖188 
In contrast to this view, I argue that the distinctive feature of legal systems 
is the presence of both primary and secondary normative rules
189
 and, 
therefore, do not agree with the Buckholtz et al. conclusion that evidence 
of neural substrates associated with punishment decisions is specifically 
evidence of the neural underpinnings of participation in a legal system. 
Ultimately, it should become feasible to carry out experiments to 
determine whether different neural substrates are engaged specifically 
when people participate in a legal system. One such experiment could use 
fMRI techniques to study the neural substrates of the framing and 
communication effects in economic experiments that most closely mimic 
the effects of the secondary rules of a legal system. For now, a link 
between neuroanatomy and law-like behavior can only be indirectly 
inferred from research showing that many tasks related to social behavior 
 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 186. Buckholtz et al., supra note 30. 
 187. Id. at 934–35. 
 188. Id. at 931 (citations omitted), 935–36. 
 189. See supra Part I.A. 
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generally and decision making in economic experiments in particular do 
engage specific neural substrates. 
2. Genetics and Participation in a Legal System 
A second source of information about a link between specialized 
faculties and the expression of a given behavior is genetic research. If the 
expression of a specific behavior is directly tied to a particular gene or 
group of genes, this provides evidence that there is an innate component of 
the behavior. 
The systematic study of the genetic underpinnings of human behavior 
is a relatively new and complex area of research.
190
 To date, there is 
limited evidence of genetic links to human language or moral behavior. 
Preliminary evidence suggests a few relationships between particular 
genes and the human language faculty. For example, the FOXP2 gene 
appears to be important in producing grammatically correct human 
language.
191
 An unusual allele
192
 of the FOXP2 gene is present among 
members of a family in which about half of the members of the family 
have difficulty using grammatically correct language.
193
  
Research into the links between genes and human moral behavior is 
even more preliminary, with evidence coming primarily from research on 
the influence of specific genes on the social behavior of other species.
194
 
For example, differences between the monogamous behavior of the prairie 
vole as compared with the polygamous behavior of the meadow vole now 
appear to be caused by differences in a single vasopressin receptor gene.
195
 
Evidence linking specific genes to behaviors associated with 
participation in a legal system is, at best, preliminary. A link between 
genes and law-like behavior can be inferred from evidence suggesting that 
people‘s genetic makeup affects how they behave in economic 
experiments. Experimenters in the United States and Switzerland find that 
 
 
 190. See generally Steven Pinker, My Genome, My Self, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, § 6 
(Magazine), at 24 (providing a review of the current state of knowledge about links between genes and 
human behavior). 
 191. Faraneh Vargha-Khadem et al., FOXP2 and the Neuroanatomy of Speech and Language, 6 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 131 (2005). 
 192. An allele is the particular version of a gene that an individual possesses. JOHN ALCOCK, 
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 86 (5th ed. 1993). 
 193. Vargha-Khadem et al., supra note 191, at 131. 
 194. See, e.g., Gene E. Robinson et al., Genes and Social Behavior, 322 SCI. 896 (2008) 
(reviewing the current state of research on the relationship between genes and social behavior 
generally). 
 195. Miranda M. Lim et al., Enhanced Partner Preference in a Promiscuous Species by 
Manipulating the Expression of a Single Gene, 429 NATURE 754, 754 (2004). 
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identical twins, siblings who share all the same genes, are more likely to 
engage in similar levels of trusting behavior in a simple trust game than 
fraternal twins who do not share all of the same genes.
196
  
Although experiments specifically considering the effects of genetics 
on behaviors engaged when participating in a legal system have yet to be 
published, such findings would suggest a genetic basis for participation in 
a legal system, further supporting the law instinct hypothesis. 
3. Specialized Cognitive Abilities 
A third source of information about specialized faculties associated 
with participation in a legal system is research on our cognitive abilities. 
Over the past thirty years, evolutionary scientists have challenged the 
notion that the brain is a general purpose cognition machine and, instead, 
have hypothesized that the human mind consists of a combination of 
specialized cognitive modules.
197
 These researchers hypothesize that the 
behaviors that specialized cognitive facilities are shown to support are 
likely to be a product of evolutionary processes.
198
 
Two cognitive tasks that humans are especially adept at are particularly 
well-suited for participation in a legal system: (1) detecting the violation 
of a logical rule when the rule is set in the context of a social contract, and 
(2) recognizing when people are surreptitiously acting in a selfish manner. 
 
 
 196. David Cesarini et al., Heritability of Cooperative Behavior in the Trust Game, 105 PROC. 
NAT‘L ACAD. SCIS. 3721, 3723 (2008); see also David Cesarini et al., Genetic Variation in Financial 
Decision Making, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1484923 (providing evidence of a similar genetic influence on how willing individuals are 
to accept risk in their investment portfolios). 
 197. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE 
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163 (Jerome H. 
Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1992). 
 198. See, e.g., John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of 
Culture, Part 1: Theoretical Considerations, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 29, 31 (1989). There 
are, however, many limitations on drawing a conclusion about the innate foundations of a particular 
behavior based solely on evidence of a specialized cognitive module. For one, the reason for the 
evolution of a particular cognitive faculty will always be open to multiple interpretations. This 
difficulty is evident in an ongoing debate between Chomsky, Fitch, and Hauser (CFH), on the one 
hand, and Jackendoff and Pinker (J&P), on the other, about what specialized cognitive abilities have 
evolved to support the human language faculty. CFH argue that there is evidence of only one 
specialized cognitive ability that developed in association with the evolution of human language (the 
ability to carry out recursive analysis). See W. Tecumseh Fitch, Marc D. Hauser & Noam Chomsky, 
The Evolution of the Language Faculty: Clarifications and Implications, 97 COGNITION 179 (2005); 
Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, supra note 8. J&P, in contrast, argue that several different specialized 
capabilities reveal the innate roots of human language. See Ray Jackendoff & Steven Pinker, The 
Nature of the Language Faculty and its Implications for Evolution of Language (Reply to Fitch, 
Hauser, and Chomsky), 97 COGNITION 211 (2005); Pinker & Jackendoff, supra note 8. 
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A specialized competence to carry out both of these tasks would greatly 
facilitate participation in a legal system.
199
 
Experiments studying how subjects perform on what is known as the 
Wason selection task show that most people are better able to detect the 
violation of a logical rule when the rule is set in the context of a social 
contract. In the Wason selection task, subjects are asked to solve the same 
logic problem in two different scenarios.
200
 In the first scenario, no social 
context is provided. The researchers ask subjects what additional 
information will help them determine if a rule in the form of If X then Y is 
correct. Specifically, subjects are shown the following four cards: X, not X, 
Y, and not Y, and asked to pick the card they would need to turn over in 
order to help determine if the statement If X then Y is correct. The correct 
choice is to turn over the card that shows not Y to see if X is on the other 
side since the only condition that will disprove the hypothesis If X then Y 
is a card that shows X and not Y. When the task is presented in this 
abstract context, less than twenty-five percent of the subjects select the 
correct card.
201
 In the second scenario, the same logical statement is set in 
a social context. For example, subjects are asked how to determine if a 
rule prohibiting underage drinking is being enforced. About seventy-five 
percent of the subjects correctly recognize that they will need to determine 
the age of someone who is observed drinking to determine if the rule is 
being violated.
202
 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby conclude from this 
research that ―human reasoning is well designed for detecting violations of 
conditional rules when these can be interpreted as cheating on a social 
contract.‖203 An ability to detect rule violations that works most accurately 
in the social contract context would enhance participation in a legal 
system.  
Another series of experiments shows that people are surprisingly adept 
at detecting when someone has violated a social rule even when there is no 
opportunity to directly observe the other person‘s actions. Sven Vanneste 
and colleagues report that subjects in one experiment are able to detect if 
another person has violated a social rule simply by looking at a picture of 
that person‘s face.204 In their experiment, Vanneste et al. present subjects 
 
 
 199. It is fair to note, however, that these capabilities would also facilitate participation in a moral 
system and a social-norms system. 
 200. Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans 
Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187, 191–92 (1989). 
 201. Id. at 192. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 197, at 205. 
 204. Sven Vanneste et al., Attention Bias Toward Noncooperative People. A Dot Probe 
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with pictures taken of the faces of people who participated in an earlier 
experiment. Vanneste et al. find that subjects in the second experiment 
stare for a longer period of time at the pictures of those who had not 
cooperated in the earlier experiments and conclude ―that an automatic, 
preconscious focus of attention underlies our ability to identify 
noncooperative players in social exchange situations.‖205 As Hauser 
observes, ―it appears that our ability to detect cheaters who violate social 
norms is one of nature‘s gifts.‖206 I would add that an innate ability to 
detect cheaters would be an especially useful capability when participating 
in a legal system. If people have an innate ability to detect cheaters, then 
the cost of maintaining a stable system of social rules, such as a legal 
system, would likely be lower. 
The existence of specialized faculties that support a particular behavior, 
such as participation in a legal system, can provide evidence that the 
behavior is innate. Research in neuroanatomy, genetics, and cognitive 
science each provide some evidence that participation in a legal system 
does, in fact, rely upon specialized faculties. 
D. Universality 
The ubiquitous expression of a behavior is another indication that the 
behavior directly draws upon innate predispositions. Language again 
provides a useful analogue. Pinker observes, ―[t]he universality of 
complex language is a discovery that fills linguists with awe, and is the 
first reason to suspect that language is not just any cultural invention but 
the product of a special human instinct.‖207 If there is a law instinct, then it 
is reasonable to expect that legal systems will be present in all human 
societies, just as language is. 
An important caveat is that the universality of a particular behavior is 
not, on its own, proof that a behavior is innate. As Daniel Dennet 
observes, ―[i]f a trick is that good, then it will be routinely rediscovered by 
every culture, without need of either genetic descent or cultural 
transmission . . . .‖208 Legal systems might be ubiquitous and not in any 
 
 
Classification Study in Cheating Detection, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 272, 274–76 (2007). 
 205. Id. at 272. In a related study, Jan Verplaetse and colleagues found that subjects could tell 
from a photograph taken at the time of an earlier decision which individuals had acted in an 
uncooperative manner. Jan Verplaetse et al., You Can Judge a Book by Its Cover: The Sequel: A 
Kernel of Truth in Predictive Cheating Detection, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 260 (2007). 
 206. HAUSER, supra note 2, at 282. 
 207. PINKER, supra note 9, at 26 (emphasis added). 
 208. DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN‘S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF 
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way innate.
209
 The discussion below showing that legal systems are, in 
fact, present in all human societies is, therefore, best understood as 
satisfying a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for proving the 
existence of a law instinct. 
1. Anthropological Research 
A survey of anthropological research (including studies of the social 
systems of hunter-gatherer societies, the unwritten social rules among 
gypsy communities, and the practices of the ranchers of Shasta County) 
suggests that legal systems are ubiquitous. That said, the anthropological 
evidence of adherence to normative rules and a shared practice of rule 
following is more complete than the evidence of a robust system of 
secondary legal rules. With respect to the evidence of secondary rules in 
the anthropological record, there is, in turn, more evidence of rules of 
recognition and of adjudication than there is evidence of rules of change. 
However, limited evidence in the anthropological record of secondary 
rules generally, and of rules of change in particular, may simply be the 
result of little direct research on this topic. 
Studies of hunter-gatherer societies offer one way to observe what the 
social practices among prehistoric humans might have been. Such 
research, as exemplified by the study of the !Kung hunter gatherers, 
reveals not only a shared system of normative rules, but also a general 
agreement on what counts as law (rules of recognition) and on how 
disputes are to be resolved (rules of adjudication). Polly Wiessner reports 
that among the !Kung there are numerous generally accepted principles 
with regard to individual‘s rights, as well as a clearly defined system for 
adjudicating and enforcing rule violations.
210
 Melvin Konner notes that a 
large amount of time and effort is spent by the !Kung in trying to 
determine when and how rules should be applied to resolve specific 
disputes. Konner writes that ―[i]f what lawyers and judges do is work, then 
when the !Kung sit up all night at a meeting discussing a hotly contested 
divorce, that is also work.‖211 Together, Wiessner and Konner‘s research 
 
 
LIFE 487 (1995). Pinker similarly observes: ―Not everything that is universal is innate.‖ PINKER, supra 
note 9, at 31. 
 209. In addition to the possibility that legal systems are ―routinely rediscovered,‖ it is also 
possible that legal systems are a highly successful cultural adaptation, or ―meme,‖ to use a term 
introduced by Richard Dawkins. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 206 (1976). 
 210. Polly Wiessner, Norm Enforcement among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen: A Case of Strong 
Reciprocity?, 16 HUM. NATURE 115, 115–43 (2005). 
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shows that essential aspects of a legal system are present among the 
!Kung—one of the few hunter-gatherer societies to be carefully studied 
over many decades. 
Walter Weyrauch studies modern social groups that rely on orally 
transmitted social rules to coordinate their behavior.
212
 Based on his 
research, Weyrauch concludes that ―[u]nwritten law is layered, just as 
written law, and can be found any place where a group gathers to pursue 
common objectives. The layers may extend from unwritten constitutional 
principles to lesser laws dealing with ordinary social discourse.‖213 For 
example, Weyrauch reports on a formal system of adjudication (the 
kris),
214
 as well as sophisticated rules of evidence,
215
 among gypsies. Just 
as our language faculty does not rely on the written word for its viability 
and complexity, Weyrauch‘s research similarly suggests that legal systems 
do not depend on written law for their viability and complexity. 
Much of the research developed by social-norms scholars also supports 
the claim that legal systems are ubiquitous, if legal systems are defined in 
terms of normativity, a two-tiered rule structure, and a shared practice of 
rule following.
216
 For example, in an analysis of the rules that guide 
interactions among ranchers in Shasta County, California, Robert 
Ellickson describes a system of social rules that contains each of the three 
features that provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a legal system. Ellickson in Order Without Law: How 
Neighbors Settle Disputes
217
 describes a social rules system among the 
ranchers of Shasta County that: (1) creates obligations that are treated as 
legitimate, (2) includes both primary rules and secondary rules, and (3) 
includes a shared practice of rule following. Two of the chapters in 
Ellickson‘s book specifically describe a robust suite of procedural, 
constitutive, and ―controller-selecting‖ norms, which are functionally 
equivalent to the types of secondary rules described by Hart in The 
 
 
371 (1982). 
 212. See, e.g., Walter O. Weyrauch, Unwritten Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1211 (1999) (discussing unwritten legal systems among an experimental group on the Berkeley 
campus, the population on the British island of Tristan da Cunha, and the Romani people (gypsies)); 
Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the “Gypsies,” 
103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993); see also A.L. Epstein, Dispute Settlement Among the Tolai, 41 OCEANIA 
157 (1971) (describing evidence of a robust pre-modern system of dispute resolution in New Guinea). 
 213. Weyrauch, supra note 212, at 121213. 
 214. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 212, at 351, 35458. 
 215. Id. at 38990. 
 216. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 217. ELLICKSON, supra note 43. 
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Concept of Law.
218
 Ellickson does not characterize the social rules 
systems of the Shasta County ranchers as a legal system,
219
 since his 
definition of what constitutes a legal system includes a requirement of 
state involvement, which my usage of the term ―legal system‖ does not.
220
 
Three earlier efforts to determine whether legal systems are present in 
all societies merit discussion when considering anthropological evidence 
of the ubiquity of legal systems. There is first anthropologist Don Brown‘s 
effort to determine what aspects of human behavior are present in all 
societies. In his book Human Universals,
221
 Brown identifies laws 
involving rights and obligations and rules of membership as present in all 
societies.
222
 Brown‘s compilation does not include material that addresses 
the issue of whether a robust system of secondary rules is also a human 
universal, but Brown‘s findings do support the conclusion that the 
normativity and shared practice of legal systems are a human universal. 
A second noteworthy foray into the anthropology of legal systems is 
the discussion of the anthropology of law offered by Hart in The Concept 
of Law.
223
 Hart measures his concept of law against the anthropological 
record and concludes that there are many societies in which a robust 
system of secondary rules does not exist. Hart writes: 
It is, of course, possible to imagine a society without a legislature, 
courts or officials of any kind. Indeed, there are many studies of 
primitive communities which not only claim that this possibility is 
realized but depict in detail the life of a society where the only 
means of social control is that general attitude of the group.
224
 
If Hart‘s statement is correct, then legal systems as Hart and I define them 
would not be a human universal. However, Hart does not provide citations 
to the ―many studies‖ upon which he relies, and my review of the 
anthropological record above reaches the opposite conclusion. 
Finally, the topic of the universality of law has been a subject of 
discussion among anthropologists for many years.
225
 There is continuing 
 
 
 218. Id. at 23064. See also HART, supra note 21. 
 219. ELLICKSON, supra note 43, at 141 (―As suggested already, many of the Shasta County 
findings cannot be squared with legal centralism.‖). 
 220. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 221. BROWN, supra note 95. 
 222. Id. at 138. 
 223. HART, supra note 21. 
 224. Id. at 89. 
 225. See, e.g., Laura Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 3, 413 
(1965). 
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disagreement among anthropologists as to whether legal systems are 
present in all societies, but this is largely a disagreement about what 
constitutes a legal system. If legal systems are defined as only existing 
when there is a central government, then obviously not all societies have a 
legal system.
226
  
However, many anthropologists do not consider state-controlled rule 
enforcement a precondition for the existence of a legal system, and these 
anthropologists generally reach the same conclusion about the ubiquity of 
legal systems in human society that I reach here. Sally Engle Merry, for 
example, based on a review of the anthropology of law research carried 
out during the beginning and middle of the twentieth century, concludes: 
Anthropological research from the 1920s to the 1950s demonstrated 
that law was a fundamental part of the normative system of any 
society and served to maintain its social order. Systems of rules 
were organically connected to distinctive social structures. Nonstate 
mechanisms such as informal moots and councils, reciprocity, 
ostracism, gossip, witchcraft accusations, and other forms of subtle 
social pressure produced social order.
227
 
Merry‘s conclusion about the ubiquity of legal systems implicitly rejects 
the notion that centralized government is a necessary prerequisite for a 
legal system. 
This review of anthropological evidence, discussing hunter-gatherers 
and various modern societies that do not rely on written laws, supports the 
claim that legal systems are a human universal.  
2. The Historical Record 
While the review of anthropological research above covers a broader 
range of human society than does the historical record, a review of the 
historical record also supports the claim that legal systems are a human 
universal. Every society for which there is a written record appears to have 
had a social rule system with each of the three attributes I identify above 
as providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
legal system: normativity, a two-tiered rule structure, and a shared practice 
 
 
 226. See, e.g., A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY: 
ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 217–19 (1952). 
 227. Sally Engle Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 575, 
576 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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of rule following.
228
 A brief survey of the historical records of societies as 
diverse as those of ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Athens, early Arabia, 
and Jewish merchants during the Middle Ages, supports this conclusion. 
Rules governing social behavior consistently appear among the oldest 
writings we have. For example, among the inscriptions that have survived 
from ancient Babylon are the 282 provisions of the Code of Hammurabi, 
dating back to 1750 BC.
229
 The Code of Hammurabi reviews legal 
precedents and sets out recommendations for how to adjudicate future 
disputes.
230
 While the Code of Hammurabi does not reveal a legal system 
in ancient Babylon that is especially flexible, the very existence and 
memorializing of these provisions does show that in ancient Babylon both 
a rule of recognition and a system of adjudication were well developed. 
Russ Versteeg observes, ―[w]hen one reads Hammurabi‘s Laws for the 
first time, it is striking to notice how contemporary many of the provisions 
seem.‖231 One can reasonably infer from the Code of Hammurabi that each 
of the three defining features of a legal system was present in ancient 
Babylon. 
The Code of Hammurabi is, moreover, typical of the discovery of the 
remnants of a legal system among ancient writings. Earlier examples of a 
written record of law include the Laws of Ur-Nammu (c. 2100 BC), the 
Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1930 BC), and the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 1970 
BC).
232
 Based on these examples, one of the first uses of writing appears to 
memorialize what will count as an enforceable normative rule within a 
social group and how such rules are to be modified and adjudicated.
233
 
The written record of the legal system of ancient Athens is more 
complete than that of ancient Babylon. Among the primary sources of law 
in ancient Athens are written records of approximately 100 oral 
arguments, and much of the literature and philosophical writing from this 
period includes reference to the legal system.
234
 From this written record, 
it is clear that in many respects the Athenian legal system is markedly 
 
 
 228. See supra Part I.A. 
 229. See, e.g., RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 1217 (2002). 
 230. Id. at 1517. 
 231. Id. at 15. 
 232. Id. at 712. 
 233. See also Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1995) (reviewing evidence of robust systems of property law 
in ancient legal systems). 
 234. ADRIAAN LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 5–6 (2006); 
Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 691 (2009) 
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different from modern Western legal systems. For example, ―Athenian 
courts enforced extra-statutory norms that were completely unrelated to 
the legal issue in dispute.‖
235
 Despite these differences, the Athenian legal 
system unambiguously contained the three features I identify as essential 
to the existence of a legal system: normativity, a two-tiered rule structure, 
and a shared practice of rule following. The Athenian law was deemed to 
create legitimate obligations by the city‘s citizens and officials, the system 
contained both primary rules and secondary rules, and there was a shared 
practice of rule following. As but one straightforward example of a 
secondary rule determining what will count as law in ancient Athens (the 
rule of recognition), ―Athenian laws were inscribed on stone stelai in 
various public areas of Athens.‖
236
 
I began this discussion of legal systems in the historical record with a 
review of the legal systems of ancient Babylon and ancient Athens 
because of their antiquity. However, these Babylonian and Athenian legal 
systems are precursors of many modern legal systems and were embedded 
in societies in which there was a central government. Therefore, these 
examples alone do not provide a fair test of the claim that legal systems 
are ubiquitous in the historical record.  
There are two other examples of a system of social rules that possess 
each of the three essential features of a legal system, both somewhat 
outside of the western legal tradition and absent a central government. For 
example, in Islamic culture, even prior to the widespread adoption of the 
Koran, the wasta system of dispute resolution was well-established.
237
 
Similarly, research carried out by Avner Greif on medieval traders 
describes a vibrant and complex system of social rules among medieval 
Jewish merchants, despite the absence of a central government to maintain 
the system.
238
 Where there is a written record, there is evidence of a legal 
system. 
 
 
 235. Lanni, Social Norms, supra note 234, at 692 n.2. 
 236. Id. at 698. For examples of rules of adjudication, see also Anastassios D. Karayiannis & 
Aristides N. Hatzis, Morality, Social Norms and Rule of Law as Transaction Cost-Saving Devices: 
The Case of Ancient Athens 3 (July 19, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1000749 (―Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection 
of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes (they even 
introduced alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration).‖). 
 237. See, e.g., Aseel Al-Ramahi, Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle 
Eastern Society, 22 ARAB L.Q. 35, 45–49 (2008).  
 238. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989). 
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This overlap between the historical record and the essential attributes 
of a legal system is expected. I primarily follow Hart‘s jurisprudence in 
describing what constitutes a legal system, and one of Hart‘s goals is to 
identify those attributes that have been present in all known legal 
systems.
239
 What I add is that the evidence based on an updated survey of 
the historical record continues to suggest that Hartian legal systems are a 
human universal among societies for which a written record exists. 
3. Behavior in Psychology Experiments 
Evidence of the universality of legal systems can also be extrapolated 
from various psychology experiments discussed above to show that 
participation in a legal system is expressed early and predictably in 
individual development and is based on a logic that is inaccessible to 
conscious reflection.
240
 If legal systems are a human universal, then one 
would expect to see the same law-like patterns of behavior emerge in these 
experiments, regardless of the culture in which they are carried out. 
Behaviors indicative of a law instinct do consistently reappear in these 
experiments.  
Economic experiments, which I argued above replicate many of the 
salient features of participation in a legal system,
241
 have generated 
findings of similar behavior in a multitude of different cultures. 
Experiments involving the ultimatum game have been carried out 
throughout the world, including among hunter-gatherers and in places 
where the stakes involved represent a significant amount of personal 
wealth.
242
 Recall that the person who is assigned the role of Player A (the 
proposer) in an ultimatum game will typically divide the pot evenly 
between the two players, and the typical Player B (the responder) will 
reject proposals that provide Player B less than twenty-five percent of the 
initial pot. This pattern of Player A making a ―fair‖ proposal and Player B 
 
 
 239. HART, supra note 21, at 237. 
 240. See supra Parts II.A and II.B, respectively. 
 241. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 242. See, e.g., Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental 
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47 (1999); Joseph Henrich, Does Culture Matter in 
Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 973 (2000); Joseph Henrich et al., Costly Punishment Across Human Societies, 
312 SCI. 1767 (2006); Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, 
Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1068 (1991); Robert Slonim & 
Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 66 
ECONOMETRICA 569 (1998). 
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rejecting an ―unfair‖ proposal occurs in all of the many cultures in which 
these experiments have been undertaken.
243
 
There are, however, several limitations to making too strong an 
inference about the universality of participation in legal systems based on 
existing experimental work. Many of the experiments most revealing of 
law-like behavior have been run in only a limited number of cultural 
settings. Experiments involving the ultimatum game, which have been run 
in the largest number of different cultures, provide evidence of the effects 
of normative considerations, but do not help in distinguishing between 
behaviors that are the product of a fixed system of normative rules (akin to 
a moral system) and behaviors that are the product of a system in which 
the content of normative rules is more malleable (akin to a legal 
system).
244
 
It would be illuminating to carry out in numerous societies those 
experiments that specifically provide evidence of law-like behavior—such 
as economic experiments that measure the effects of framing and allowing 
communication. If the effects of these framing and communication 
manipulations are similar in all societies, then this finding would provide 
more direct experimental evidence that participation in a legal system is a 
human universal. 
If a behavior is innate, then one would expect to observe that behavior 
in all societies. Anthropological research, the historical record, and 
experimental psychology findings all suggest that legal systems are a 
human universal. This ubiquity of legal systems in human society is 
consistent with the law instinct hypothesis. 
E. Viable Product of Evolutionary Processes 
The final issue to be considered in evaluating a claim that a particular 
behavior is instinctive is the issue of evolutionary viability. Evolutionary 
viability addresses whether it is plausible that a behavior was produced by 
evolutionary processes given what is known about how evolution works. 
 
 
 243. See, e.g., Nowak et al., supra note 115, at 1173. 
 244. Even within the context of experiments involving the ultimatum game, a fair degree of 
intercultural variability does emerge. See, e.g., Benedikt Herrmann et al., Antisocial Punishment 
Across Societies, 319 SCI. 1362 (2008). One might infer from this intercultural variability that these 
experiments reveal the effects of a more flexible normative rules system (akin to a legal system) than 
the effects of other types of normative systems. However, an alternative explanation for the inter-
cultural variability observed is that differences in normative behavior arise from differences in, for 
example, rearing practices. Such differences among cultures in normative behavior would be 
consistent with some models of how the specific content of normative precepts is established early in 
development and need not be evidence of the universality of legal systems. 
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Arguments in support of the evolutionary viability of a behavior tend to 
take one of two forms. First, evolutionary viability claims are supported by 
presenting evidence of similar behavior in other species. Presumably, a 
behavior that evolved in another species could also evolve in humans. 
Second, arguments are offered that describe a specific dynamic or process 
by which evolutionary forces can lead to the proliferation of the behavior. 
Such processes are often described using formal mathematical models.  
I offer both a review of similar behavior in other species and a 
consideration of the dynamics by which a law instinct could evolve to 
support the claim that a law instinct could be a product of evolutionary 
processes. 
1. Comparative Ethology 
The study of the behavior of other species provides an avenue by which 
to test a claim that a particular human behavior is the product of natural 
selection. There are two ways in which ethology, the scientific study of 
animal behavior, is relevant to the claim that participation in a legal 
system draws directly upon innate foundations. First, if other species use 
legal systems to organize their social behavior, then this would confirm 
that evolution can produce a law instinct. Second, ethology might uncover 
a sufficiently large number of precursor or ―proto‖ behaviors to make a 
claim of the development through natural selection of a law instinct more 
plausible. 
I am not aware of evidence of legal systems among other species, if 
one presumes, as I do, that a robust system of both primary rules and 
secondary rules is an essential feature of legal systems.
245
 However, the 
absence of a full-fledged legal system in other species is not especially 
problematic for my claim that a law instinct is evolutionarily viable. As 
the brain size of social animals increases, the complexity of their social-
rule systems increases as well.
246
 For example, a comparative study of four 
species of hyenas shows that there is a positive correlation between the 
 
 
 245. Other scholars, most notably Gruter, survey the ethological evidence and reach a different 
conclusion. Gruter observes, for example: ―Precursors of legal behavior in non-human primates 
suggest that some elements of a sense of justice are transmitted genetically, i.e. legal behavior may be 
an innate biological mechanism, vital for survival.‖ Gruter, Origins, supra note 20, at 43. However, on 
my reading, Gruter‘s suggestion that legal systems exist in other species depends upon her assumption 
that there are only two essential features to legal systems: normativity and a shared practice of rule 
following. 
 246. See, e.g., Natalie Angier, Political Animals (Yes, Animals), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at F1. 
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complexity of the hyena species‘ social system and the size of the hyena 
species‘ prefrontal cortex.247  
Utilizing a more complex system of social rules than those of other 
species would seem to be the type of task for which the large human brain 
is well-suited. Moreover, human cognition appears to be superior to that of 
other primates, especially when it comes to carrying out tasks that involve 
social cognition. Esther Herrmann and colleagues compare the cognitive 
abilities of human infants with those of infants of other primates and find 
minimal differences between the performance of human infants and 
chimpanzee infants on most cognitive tasks.
248
 However, human infants 
significantly outperform other primates when the task involves acquiring 
social knowledge.
249
 Legal systems, particularly their two-tiered rule 
structure, may be uniquely human, but our brains are also comparatively 
larger and our cognitive abilities particularly well-attuned to carrying out 
social calculations. 
A second way in which ethology research can support the evolutionary 
viability of a law instinct is by revealing evidence of the presence in other 
species of behaviors that could be precursors to a law instinct. Evidence of 
precursor behaviors to participation in a legal system would suggest that 
the behavioral building blocks of a law instinct might have been present 
early in human evolution.
250
 Evolution often works by assembling 
preexisting parts through a process known as ―exaptation.‖251 Exaptation 
almost certainly played a role in the development of the human language 
faculty. Pinker and Ray Jackendoff observe, ―language is unlikely to be 
just a straightforward exaptation of a single pre-existing recursive system 
such as visual cognition, motor control, or social relationships. Rather, it 
appears to be a kind of interface or connective tissue among partly pre-
existing recursive systems, mapping among them in an evolutionarily 
novel manner.‖252 
 
 
 247. Carl Zimmer, Sociable, and Smart: In Spotted Hyenas, Clues to Why the Human Brain Grew 
So Large and Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at D1. 
 248. Esther Herrmann et al., Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The 
Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis, 317 SCI. 1360 (2007). But see Frans B.M. de Waal et al., Letter to 
the Editor, Comparing Social Skills of Children and Apes, 319 SCI. 569 (2008) (raising the possibility 
that Herrmann et al.‘s use of human social cues to test social skills handicapped ape performance 
specifically in the social domain).  
 249. Herrmann et al., supra note 248, at 1362. 
 250. Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones use the apt term ―proto-legal systems‖ to describe behaviors in 
the animal kingdom that could be precursors to human legal systems. Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 
supra note 5, at 164445 (citing OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret 
Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986)). 
 251. Pinker & Jackendoff, supra note 8, at 230–31. 
 252. Id. at 231. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
324 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:269 
 
 
 
 
There is much evidence in other species of the types of precursor 
behaviors to legal systems that would facilitate the evolution of a law 
instinct. For one, there is evidence that animals use normative rules to 
guide their behavior. Sarah Brosnan and de Waal find that capuchin 
monkeys refuse to carry out tasks in exchange for food if the allocation of 
food rewards appears to the monkeys to be done in an unfair manner.
253
 
While the behavior of capuchin monkeys observed by Brosnan and de 
Waal may be more comparable to moral behavior than legal behavior, 
evidence of any form of normative behavior is relevant to the evolutionary 
viability of a law instinct in the same way that animal communication 
provides one clue that human language is innate.  
There are also examples in animal behavior of a second aspect of 
participation in a legal system—the shared practice of rule following. 
Systems of social rules play a central role in coordinating behavior among 
many social species. Dominance hierarchies, for example, are widespread 
among social species, and hierarchies are essentially an implementation of 
a system of social rules.
254
 The tasks associated with creating and 
maintaining these hierarchies are often quite complex, and so the ability of 
social animals to abide by social rules likely provides fertile ground for 
developing the aptitudes necessary to participate in a legal system. 
There is even evidence of rudimentary systems of secondary rules in 
the social-rule systems of some species. For example, there are hints of a 
system of adjudication among chimpanzees. In Chimpanzee Politics, de 
Waal describes an incident in which a dispute between two chimpanzees 
was resolved by deferring to an impartial third individual.
255
 De Waal also 
reports on a study of dispute resolution among golden monkeys that 
―found that male golden monkeys actively promote peaceful coexistence 
among their females, intervening in virtually every female altercation.‖256 
Ethological research supports the evolutionary viability of a law 
instinct by showing that social-rule systems, sometimes quite complex, are 
widely observed in other species.  
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2. Modeling the Evolution of a Law Instinct 
Speculating how a behavior might have evolved when arguing that a 
behavior is innate is also customary. Such an explanation usually starts 
with the decision to focus on a particular evolutionary process.
257
 My 
focus will be on how natural selection could have led to the evolution of a 
law instinct. 
Natural selection occurs when random variations in traits are 
differentially reproduced in subsequent generations.
258
 Charles Darwin 
famously described how the process of natural selection can lead to the 
development, without any planning or aforethought, of complex traits that 
are tailored to take advantage of specific opportunities in the 
environment.
259
 Richard Dawkins aptly analogizes the process by which 
natural selection can create order out of disorder to the work of a blind 
watchmaker.
260
 One notable requirement for the validity of a claim that a 
behavior is the product of natural selection is that the hypothesized path of 
evolutionary development must be evolutionarily viable at each step along 
the way.
261
  
In the context of human evolution, one can be precise about the 
mechanisms by which natural selection typically operates. Human traits 
are primarily passed on to subsequent generations by means of genetic 
transmission (genes are the units of DNA which code for the production of 
a particular protein).
262
 Therefore, natural selection in humans occurs 
primarily through competition among genes. Again, Dawkins offers an apt 
term, ―the selfish gene,‖ to summarize the gene-based nature of most 
human natural selection.
263
 An explanation of the evolution of human 
behavior by natural selection should show how a gene or combination of 
genes that lead to the expression of the behavior could be reproductively 
successful over the course of evolutionary time. 
An evolutionary viability argument in the context of a language instinct 
is relatively straightforward: a more flexible and nuanced communication 
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faculty would likely benefit those who were able to use such a system to 
communicate.
264
 The evolutionary viability argument with respect to the 
claim that humans possess a moral instinct is more complex and refined. 
Explanations of the evolution of moral behavior address how genes that 
lead to this behavior could also be selected for, even when those who 
behave in a ―moral‖ manner may be personally disadvantaged by doing so. 
Numerous explanations of the evolution of seemingly selfless behavior 
have been offered, including explanations based on the benefits of 
favoring one‘s kin,265 of sustaining both direct266 and indirect267 
reciprocity, and the effects of group selection.
268
 
An explanation of the evolutionary viability of a law instinct would 
parallel the explanations given for the evolution of both a language faculty 
and a moral instinct.
269
 Just as language provides a nuanced and flexible 
system by which to communicate, legal systems provide a nuanced and 
flexible system with which to organize social behavior. Just as the 
perspective of the selfish gene can explain a willingness to abide by moral 
commitments, so too can it explain the willingness to abide by legal 
commitments.  
There are, however, several challenges to developing a more precise 
specification of the mechanism by which a law instinct might have 
evolved. A formal model of the adaptive utility of a behavior requires first 
assuming that certain rules are in place to organize behavior, but law 
solves precisely these kinds of organizational problems by providing a 
framework in which such rules can be applied.
270
 Flexible behaviors—
such as law and language—also address a variety of different problems, 
which means that any single explanation is unlikely to be adequate.
271
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Finally, different models will be difficult to compare because social 
behavior only leaves indirect evidence of its presence in the archeological 
record.
272
 
It seems fair to conclude that a model explaining the evolutionary 
viability of a law instinct is as plausible as the models that are generally 
accepted as providing an evolutionarily viable model of the evolution of a 
language instinct or a moral instinct.  
Both ethological research into related behavior in other species and a 
consideration of the modeling through natural selection of a law instinct 
support the claim that a law instinct could have been produced by 
evolutionary processes.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article explores the possibility that a reliance on legal systems to 
organize social activity is an integral part of human nature. This 
possibility, which I call the law instinct hypothesis, offers an alternative to 
a purely instrumental view of law.  
The evaluation of the law instinct hypothesis presented here begins by 
distinguishing legal systems from other social practices. I make such 
distinctions largely following the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart. 
Particularly significant is Hart‘s identification of the crucial role of the 
union of primary rules and secondary rules in a legal system. The joining 
of primary rules with secondary rules in a legal system explains how legal 
systems have a degree of flexibility with respect to the content of 
normative rules that is qualitatively different from the social rule systems 
of other species. The secondary rules in a legal system are, in this respect, 
analogous to the rules of grammar in human language, which allow for a 
more flexible communication system than do the communication systems 
of other species. My claim is that a law instinct, much like a language 
instinct, is a unique and distinctive feature of innate human behavior. 
There is much evidence that humans actually do possess a law instinct. 
Studies of the ways in which children behave in the laboratory and on the 
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playground, psychology experiments in which adults make decisions with 
real economic consequences, and the application of new technologies to 
uncover the neuroanatomy of human social behavior all suggest that 
humans have an innate predisposition to rely on legal systems to organize 
their social behavior. Evidence from the historical and anthropological 
records and a consideration of the evolutionary viability of a law instinct 
are consistent with the law instinct hypothesis. 
A logical next question concerns the implications if humans possess a 
law instinct. What happened after researchers began to expose the innate 
foundations of language is instructive in suggesting what the ultimate 
significance of the claims in this Article might be. When a universal 
grammar underlying all human languages was uncovered, the rules of 
grammar were not suddenly upended. Instead, the possibility that language 
was a product of innate predispositions changed our perspective on 
language and launched a multidisciplinary exploration of the innate 
foundations of human language, an effort which continues to improve our 
understanding of language as a complex natural phenomenon to this day. 
The implications from the law instinct hypothesis are similar. The 
possibility of a law instinct does not suddenly alter what we already know 
about the content and application of law. Instead, the argument that we 
possess a law instinct can initiate an effort to uncover links between innate 
predispositions and participation in a legal system and establish the path 
by which future research can advance our understanding of how and why 
we innately turn to legal systems as a way to order our lives. Such a 
research effort might uncover direct links between innate predispositions 
and specific aspects of participation in a legal system that have important 
policy ramifications. This Article shows why such links are likely to exist 
and how to uncover them, but careful work still remains to be done.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/2
